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Resumen y conclusiones 
 
Esta tesis analiza el impacto de las relaciones inter-organizativas sobre el 
rendimiento a corto y largo plazo de las empresas. Todos los artículos incluyen 
un análisis cuantitativo de una base de datos que se construyó para esta tesis, 
y que incluye datos económicos de todas las empresas de ferrocarriles que 
operaron en España desde el inicio de la industria en 1848 hasta la Guerra Civil 
Española. El primer trabajo incluido en la tesis examina el peso de las 
relaciones directas, entre empresas que interactúan la una con la otra, y de las 
relaciones difusas, entre empresas de la misma industria que no tienen 
relaciones directas, sobre la mortalidad organizativa. Este capítulo contribuye a 
la literatura de ecología de las poblaciones y demuestra que la competencia 
geográficamente localizada y las cooperaciones entre empresas 
respectivamente aumentan y reducen la mortalidad, pero que el impacto de las 
relaciones difusas persiste después de controlar por todas las relaciones 
directas. El segundo artículo examina más detalladamente las relaciones 
directas entre empresas, y estima el efecto de dichas relaciones sobre la 
mortalidad, en función de la forma organizativa de las empresas que 
establecen un acuerdo de cooperación. Contribuye a la literatura sobre redes 
sociales y ecología de las poblaciones, al demostrar que las conexiones entre 
empresas tienen beneficios diferentes en función de la identidad y los recursos 
de cada organización. En particular, se demuestra que algunas estrategias de 
cooperación pueden ser perjudiciales a largo plazo para las organizaciones que 
las establecen, y que los efectos de las conexiones pueden ser asimétricos 
para las dos empresas conectadas. Finalmente, el tercer artículo examina el 
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efecto de distintas estrategias de coopetición sobre el rendimiento financiero de 
las empresas. Muestra que las estrategias dominadas por la competencia 
generan más beneficios que las dominadas por la cooperación, pero que este 
efecto se reduce a medida que crece el número de competidores presentes en 
el mercado. Este artículo contribuye a la literatura estratégica en general, al 
mostrar qué relaciones son beneficiales para diferentes estructuras de 
mercado, y a la literatura sobre coopetición en particular por el uso de una base 
de datos que incorpora todas las relaciones entre empresas en una industria 
durante muchos años, en lugar de centrarse en unos casos salientes como han 
hecho muchos estudios anteriores. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 
How do inter-organizational relationships in a population of firms from a 
single industry affect their performance? In this dissertation, I address this 
question in three essays that adopt different theoretical and empirical 
perspectives. 
 
In the first essay, “Disentangling direct and diffuse ecological processes: 
The effects of dyadic ties and density on survival” I examine the role of diffuse 
and direct relationships in an industry on organizational mortality. I draw on the 
literature in population ecology to examine the dyadic- and population-level 
forces that affect mortality rates. This essay attempts to provide an answer to 
the ongoing debate on the nature of diffuse ecological processes that operate at 
the population-level: some scholars have defended that diffuse competition and 
diffuse legitimation occur even when two organizations have no direct 
relationships, while others have claimed that the use of a diffuse measure such 
as density is only driven by the lack of data on all the inter-organizational 
relationships in a population, and that diffuse processes only capture the 
average of these unobserved direct relationships. Thanks to the database that I 
use in this essay, I am able to disentangle direct and diffuse forces, and to show 
that population- and dyadic-level forces are of a different nature and 
simultaneously shape the dynamics of organizational populations. 
 
The second essay, “The liability of connectedness: Organizational forms, 
network ties and mortality among Spanish railway companies, 1848-1935”, 
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analyzes in greater depth the impact of ties between firms on organizational 
mortality. It distinguishes between different types of ties, depending on the 
organizational form of the organizations that connect to each other. It draws on 
the literature on population ecology and social networks to examine how ties 
between different organizational forms affect organizational mortality, and 
questions the idea that ties between organizations are beneficial under any 
circumstances. In this essay, I claim that ties do not only mitigate competition 
between firms and give access to important resources, which increases survival 
chances, but that they can also affect a firm’s identity in a positive or negative 
manner. I show that when ties are formed between organizations of a different 
form, they can create a liability of connectedness and increase mortality rates. 
 
Finally, the third paper, “Exploring the link between coopetitive strategies, 
industry structure and firm performance”, assesses the effect of cooperation 
and competition strategies on financial performance. In particular, it examines 
how the choice of a specific balance of competition and cooperation in the 
relationships with its partner affects an organization’s income, and how this 
relationship evolves under different industry structures. This essay draws on the 
literatures on coopetition, multimarket contact and competitive aggressiveness, 
and contributes to the literature in strategy by empirically testing the 
consequences of different coopetition strategies on performance and showing 
under which conditions these strategies should be chosen. 
 
The empirical testing of the propositions developed in the three essays 
relies on a single database that was specifically gathered for this dissertation. In 
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order to study the effect of the complete set of interorganizational relationships 
in a population, I chose an industry in which these relationships were easily 
observed and reliably tracked. The Spanish railway industry provided an ideal 
setting for the three studies in this dissertation, because direct relationships 
between organizations are limited by the geographical situation of each 
company – railway companies can only engage in direct rivalry or cooperation 
when they are both active in the same city – and because the relevance of the 
industry and its regulation implied that all such relationships were tracked. 
Furthermore, all the information that is available on this industry has been 
stored in the Railway Historical Archives (AHF, Archivo Histórico Ferroviario) in 
Madrid, which is open to the public. I gathered data for the whole period of 
operation of the railway companies under competitive conditions, from the 
opening to public service of the first railroad between Barcelona and Mataró in 
1848 to the last year before the Spanish Civil War, which started in 1936 and 
after which most railways were nationalized and merged into a single State-
owned entity. 
The first step in building this database was to create a complete and 
reliable census of the industry. The main source of information were the annual 
directories of the railway companies that were published by a civil engineer 
working for one of the major railway companies, la Compañía de los Caminos 
de Hierro del Norte de España (Northern Spain Railway Company). The 
information contained in these directories (La Torre, 1893-1935) was easy to 
exploit and very complete. It included many valuable financial figures, 
particularly for the major companies, such as annual number of passengers, 
tons of freight and income. However, there were two major problems in relying 
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on these directories to build the census: firstly, some of the companies were still 
included for a few years after shutting down, which could lead to errors in 
assessing the causes of their closure (for Chapters 2 and 3), and secondly, the 
directories did not exist before 1893, which left an important period uncovered. 
Two additional secondary sources, published by the Foundation of Spanish 
Railways (FFE, Fundación de los Ferrocarriles Españoles), which hosts the 
AHF, allowed solving the abovementioned problems. García Raya (2006) uses 
archival data to develop a very complete and accurate chronology of most 
openings of tracks and which company they belonged to, and if a road was 
eventually closed, it reports the year in which that happened. Muñoz Rubio 
(2006) includes all the openings of narrow-gauge railway tracks. These two 
publications allowed me to check the reliability of the data and to get access to 
the information that was missing from the annual directories. Because only 
García Raya’s (2006) paper was available in electronic format, the coding of the 
census was difficult: after building a first version of it, I compared it again with 
the original sources and eliminated some errors. 
Once the census of the Spanish railway population was completed, I 
gathered data on the localization of the tracks operated by each company and 
its evolution from year to year, in order to get information on the local 
competitors and partners that every firm had. In the dissertation, I considered 
that two companies were connected if they share a station, where passengers 
and goods could easily make a connection between the two companies’ trains. 
The rationale for that is explained in more detail in the following chapters. 
Because some companies had thousands of kilometers of tracks and hundreds 
of stations, I only focused on the approximately 140 cities that were served by 
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two or more companies at some point in time. The first method for approaching 
that number and the relationships between companies in these cities was to use 
the maps included in La Torre directories, which gave a good idea of the places 
where connections occurred but were not available from the AHF for all years. I 
started with the first year of my dataset, and tracked all the openings of tracks 
that took place in each year to update the count of companies operating in each 
of the potential connecting point. When two companies operated in the same 
city, I coded them as partners if they shared a station using the information on 
the ownership of each station tracked in García Raya (2006) and Muñoz Rubio 
(2006), and coded them as local competitors otherwise. I had to be particularly 
careful when a company was acquired by another to take into account the 
transfer of its tracks to the acquiring firm. Information on changes in ownership 
was extracted from Artola (1978), García Raya (2006) and Muñoz Rubio (2006). 
I used yearly changes in the number of kilometers of tracks operated by each 
company to make sure that all the newly owned or opened tracks were included 
in my matrices. Finally, when the coding was completed, I checked the 
accuracy of the matrix for the final year, and did the same process again 
backwards, starting from 1935 and correcting the errors in the coding. Finally, I 
checked that the matrices were symmetric (meaning that if firm A was 
connected to B, B was also reported as connected to A) to ensure that the 
number of coding errors was minimal. 
The number of passengers transported by each company on each year and 
its income were taken from the annual directories, and for the years previous to 
its existence, from the two major periodical publications of the industry, the 
Revista de los Caminos de Hierro (the Review of Railways) which was first 
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published in 1856 and from the Gaceta de los Caminos de Hierro (the Gazette 
of Railways), which started publishing in 1866. Since the companies had to 
send their annual financial reports to these journals, the information in these 
publications is very complete and accurate. Finally, some of the missing figures 
were found in the Revista de Obras Públicas (the Review of Public Works) 
which was edited by the Ministry of Public Works and where financial reports 
were published before the creation of specific industrial publications. I also used 
the tables in the appendix of Muñoz Rubio (2006), which gather information that 
was extracted from the companies’ annual reports. The Review of Public Works 
was the only one of these sources that existed in electronic version. 
The construction of this database is the first contribution of this dissertation. 
The three essays which use this dataset are included in Chapters 2, 3, and 4, 
while Chapter 5 presents the general contributions, limitations and conclusions 
of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 - Disentangling direct and diffuse ecological 
processes: The effects of dyadic ties and density on survival 
 
Researchers in population ecology have long recognized the necessity to 
account not only for diffuse relations between organizations of a single 
population, as assessed in density-dependence theory (Carroll & Hannan, 
1989), but also for dyadic relationships between specific organizations (Baum & 
Korn, 1996, 1999; Baum & Singh, 1994) to explain birth and mortality rates in 
organizational populations. However, because data on dyadic relationships over 
long periods of time are difficult to gather, most ecological studies have only 
used density and assume that it captured the average effect of dyads. This 
assumption has been challenged by population ecologists, and there is an 
ongoing debate on “whether diffuse competition as modeled in the basic density 
model captures a distinct process or simply represents a good shorthand 
approximation to direct competition averaged across an entire population” 
(Carroll & Hannan, 2000: 230). The focus on diffuse processes has also 
fostered criticisms on the capacity of population ecology to approximate industry 
evolution (Durand, 2006). 
Studies in which dyadic ties have been explicitly considered along with 
diffuse processes as drivers of vital rates have emphasized one aspect of inter-
organizational relationships, namely competition (e.g. Baum & Haveman, 1997; 
Baum & Mezias, 1992), rather than the consequences of cooperation (Singh & 
Mitchell, 1996), but none has taken both facets into account. In this paper, I 
measure both dyadic competition and dyadic cooperation, while controlling for 
diffuse processes through a measure of density, in order to test for the 
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coexistence of direct and diffuse ecological processes in shaping mortality rates 
in a population. 
Knowing whether diffuse processes represent a distinct phenomenon or 
whether they are observed when some of the effects of dyadic ties are omitted 
is not only relevant for population ecologists: if diffuse and direct processes 
coexist to shape industrial demography, as my results indicate, then research in 
organization studies has to focus on the differences between these phenomena, 
the different drivers of both, and the resulting effect of these forces under 
diverse circumstances. 
I use data from the Spanish railway population, in which dyadic 
relationships are easy to track for the full period of analysis. In this population, 
market contacts between organizations can be of two types: cooperative ties 
occur when railway companies share a station in a city, so that trains can pass 
easily from the roads of one company to those of the other, and the companies 
need to coordinate on fares, schedules and other operating matters; competitive 
dyads are those between companies which serve the same city but operate 
from different stations and do not share tracks. I also include a population 
density measure to control for diffuse processes which may not be captured by 
my measure of direct relationships – cooperative or competitive – between 
organizations. 
My results show that cooperative ties increase the probability of acquisition, 
and reduce the probability of failure, especially when connections are 
numerous. Direct competition reduces the probability of acquisition but does not 
significantly affect the probability of failure. Finally, I find that density-dependent 
processes persist after accounting for dyadic relationships, thus showing that in 
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the Spanish railway industry diffuse processes are not a measure of direct 
processes averaged over the population, but correspond to a different 
phenomenon that is not captured by the set of dyadic relationships in the 
population. 
These results are important first because they contribute to the debate on 
whether diffuse processes exist independently from other processes in 
industrial populations and second because some studies have looked at the 
effect of connections to external actors on survival (e.g. Baum & Oliver, 1991; 
Cattani, Ferriani, Negro, & Perretti, 2008; Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990), 
but very few have examined cooperative ties within a population. 
In the next section, I discuss how cooperative dyadic ties affect mortality, 
and explain why diffuse processes may persist when dyadic ties are taken into 
account. The methods section presents the data used in this study, and shows 
how I measure direct processes and model mortality rates as a function of both 
direct and diffuse processes. In the results sections I present my main findings 
and explain what they mean for mortality dynamics. The concluding section 
discusses how these results fit into the debate on the nature and importance of 
direct and diffuse processes in ecological models, and advocates for combining 
the two perspectives in studies of organizational demography. 
 
DIRECT AND DIFFUSE ECOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN ORGANIZATIONAL 
DEMOGRAPHY 
Ecological models have originally assessed population dynamics based on 
diffuse relationships between firms, as measured by density, the raw count of 
organizations in the population (Carroll & Hannan, 1989). Density-dependent 
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dynamics of the population reflect two processes, legitimation, which increases 
survival chances, and diffuse competition, which increases mortality. Both 
processes have a higher impact on survival chances when the number of 
organizations in the population is larger. The combination of these processes 
yields a curvilinear effect: survival chances first increase with the number of 
organizations, until an inflexion point where the negative effect of competition 
becomes larger than the positive effect of legitimation. 
Similarly, two distinct direct processes are suggested to affect the survival 
chances of population members: direct competition (Hannan & Freeman, 1989) 
and cooperation – through partnerships or alliances. Direct competition differs 
from diffuse competition because it occurs between two organizations that are 
“directly identifiable to each other” (Baum & Korn, 1996: 255) and depends on 
the overlap of the resources on which they draw (Baum & Singh, 1994; Hannan 
& Freeman, 1977; McPherson, 1983). Cooperation occurs when two 
organizations establish relations with each other in order to pursue some 
common goal. 
Because the goal of the paper is to examine the persistence of diffuse 
processes after including competitive and cooperative processes, I first provide 
hypotheses regarding the effect of cooperation on population survival rates, and 
then hypothesize on the persistence of diffuse processes after controlling for 
direct processes. 
 
Cooperative dyadic ties and mortality 
While some ecological studies focus on the effect of direct competition on 
population dynamics, research exploring the effect of cooperative ties between 
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population members on mortality rates is underdeveloped. Most studies tend to 
focus on ties to external actors (e.g. Singh, Tucker, & Meinhard, 1991). These 
ties are found in a variety of settings to increase survival chances as predicted 
by resource dependence (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and institutional theory 
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). A study on nonprofit organizations 
(Hager, Galaskiewicz, & Larson, 2004) explains failure of young organizations 
as a consequence of their lack of structural embeddedness. It finds that social 
capital and institutional ties of nonprofit organizations interact with the liability-
of-newness effect in shaping the demographic evolution of the organizational 
population. Connections to political parties are found to buffer Finnish 
newspapers from environmental turbulences (Miner et al., 1990). Similarly, in a 
study of U.S. feature film producers (Cattani et al., 2008) it is shown that the 
degree of connectivity and repeatedness of interactions within an inter-
organizational network increase survival rates. 
An unexplored but potentially critical factor influencing firms’ survival is the 
development of cooperative ties with organizations within the population. As it 
occurs for ties to external actors, these ties may provide firms with additional 
resources that improve performance. Evidence suggests that stable 
interorganizational networks increase access to resources which in turn reduces 
mortality rates (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Failure of a partner 
within a population was found to increase mortality rates (Singh & Mitchell, 
1996). This result suggests that cooperative ties have an effect in enhancing 
survival chances. In my setting, cooperation between two railway companies is 
likely to increase the traffic volume of both companies, as it enhances the 
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access of passengers and goods to a higher number of locations. Increased 
traffic improves financial performance and reduces the probability of failure. 
Because organizations can cease operations as an independent entity for a 
variety of reasons, I also examine the effect of cooperative dyadic ties on the 
probability of acquisition. Since railroad companies with connections to other 
railroads are less likely to fail, they will be perceived as attractive takeover 
targets. This expectation is consistent with the large number of studies showing 
that acquired firms are often not poorly managed but rather attractive ones, for 
example, because they have a large market share or operate in areas that are 
rich in customers (Agrawal & Jaffe, 2003; Hannan & Rhoades, 1987). More 
importantly, one of the major aims pursued by mergers and acquisitions is to 
develop synergies between the two firms (Cigola & Modesti, 2008; Larson & 
Gonedes, 1969) and organizations that present complementarities to the focal 
firm before acquisition– in this setting, because their railroads are connected to 
the focal firm’s network – are the acquisition targets that are most likely to yield 
such synergies. In the railway setting in which the initial fixed costs of building a 
new railroad are extremely high, connected railway companies are a convenient 
acquisition target as they allow for an extension of the network without 
experiencing the cost of building new infrastructures, such as roads and 
stations. Acquiring unconnected railroads is more costly, because the acquirer 
would have to build tracks linking its network with the roads of the acquired firm 
in order to benefit from synergies and the net effect of the acquisition is less 
likely to be positive. 
For these reasons, I expect the following relationships between cooperative 
ties and the probabilities of exit by failure or acquisition: 
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- Hypothesis 1a: Cooperative ties between organizations reduce their 
probability of failure 
- Hypothesis 1b: Cooperative ties between organizations increase their 
probability of being acquired 
 
Persistence of diffuse processes 
Diffuse processes will persist after controlling for direct relationships of 
cooperation and competition if they capture a collective process occurring at the 
population-level instead of the average of all dyadic processes in the 
population. 
Since very few studies have looked simultaneously at cooperative and 
competitive dyadic ties, it has been impossible to test directly whether a diffuse 
process still takes place after controlling for all dyadic relationships. However, 
there are a number of theoretical reasons and some empirical evidence 
supporting the existence of collective processes together with dyadic 
relationships. Arguments on the collective learning induced by population 
ageing, which differs from organization ageing (Hannan, Carroll, Dobrev, Han, & 
Torres, 1998) or on the influence of collective identity on mortality rates 
(Swaminathan, 2001) highlight some of the processes occurring beyond the 
dyadic level that are not captured by measures of direct competition and 
cooperation alone. 
Studies of a community of early telephone companies have shown that 
collective action affects population dynamics in a way that is not fully captured 
by density models: the “liability of collective action” (Barnett, 1994) is observed 
when some companies simultaneously experience direct benefits from contacts 
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with the major operator and suffer from the diffuse competition generated in the 
population by an increase in the number of active organizations. Barnett and 
Carroll (1987) find that both direct and diffuse competition can occur 
simultaneously between organizations, depending on the intensity of their 
relationships, and also observe that in some cases, symbiosis seems to exist 
between organizations that compete with others at a diffuse level, although they 
do not have data on dyadic ties to further support this claim. 
Conversely, a study on network structure in the airline industry finds that 
the network measures used to predict mortality rates perform better than the 
usual concentration measures, supporting the idea that direct processes 
between connected organizations are not fully captured by diffuse processes 
reflected in density and concentration models (Seidel, 1997). Thus, it seems 
that measuring either direct or diffuse processes separately is not enough to 
explain the dynamics of industrial evolution. 
Calls for the development of community ecology examining ecological 
processes among organizational forms linked by a collective identity and acting 
interdependently (Freeman & Audia, 2006; Ruef, 2000) have come from the 
necessity to enhance the understanding of the set of diffuse and direct forces 
that shape corporate demography. 
Thus, I expect that: 
- Hypothesis 2: Density-dependent processes persist when controlling for 
direct ecological processes 
 
 
 
The Spanish railway industry, 1848
My dataset is formed by the 146 railway companies that operated in Spain 
at some point during the period 1848
they correspond to the full period of competitive 
railway sector. In 1848, the first Spanish railroad opened between the stations 
of Barcelona and Mataró. 1935 was the last year of normal operation of the 
Spanish railways before the Spanish Civil War which interrupted the service 
most roads and destroyed infrastructures. Immediately after the end of the Civil 
War, Franco’s dictatorship decided to nationalize the large majority of the 
railway companies and group them into a single state
 
Figure 1: Density of Spanis
 
The number of railway companies operating in Spain varied between 1 in 
1848 and its maximum number of 94 in 1928. The density measure was 
obtained from the census of the population that 
(1893-1935) and, for years previous to 1893, from the two weekly journals of 
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the industry, the Gaceta de los Caminos de Hierro and the Revista de los 
Caminos de Hierro. 
The reliability of the data used to build the census was cross-checked using 
two additional sources, on the opening on railroad sections since 1848 (García 
Raya, 2006) and a book on narrow-gauge railways (Muñoz Rubio, 2006), both 
based on primary archival data. 
All the companies in this population transported passengers (although 2 
companies in my dataset operated for a few years with freight only before 
including passenger service) and most transported freight as well, with the 
exception of some short-distance suburban companies that were dedicated to 
passenger transportation only. The roads were assigned by the State through 
an auction mechanism. The winning company obtained the exclusive right to 
exploit the road but competitors could serve the same stations indirectly: for 
example, only one company had a direct railroad from Madrid to Zaragoza, but 
another company offered the possibility to go from Madrid to Zaragoza through 
Valladolid and Burgos. Since speed was not a determinant factor in the decision 
to ride a specific train (Bennassar, 1992), at least before the development of car 
transportation in the 1920s, companies that served the same cities could be 
considered as competitors even if one was faster than the others in reaching 
the final destination. 
 
The model 
I test my hypotheses on the impact of diffuse and direct processes on 
mortality rates through a multinomial logit model, which estimates the probability 
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of the different exit types for each company depending on the direct connection, 
direct competition and density variables. 
I use a competing risks model because the exit event can be of two types, 
acquisition and failure. In this setting, I group two forms of failure under one 
single category: failure of firms that run out of business and whose roads close, 
and failure of firms whose roads were acquired by the State: during my whole 
period of analysis and until the end of the Spanish Civil war, the State only 
acquired companies out of economic reasons, i.e. because the private activity 
was not profitable, and not for ideological reasons as it happened at the 
beginning of Franco’s dictatorship (Artola, 1978). Thus I measure the probability 
of 1) being acquired or 2) failing (by closure or acquisition by the State) with 
respect to the probability of event 0, non-exit. 
 
Independent variables 
I build my direct competition and cooperation variables in the following way: 
in each geographic point that was served by more than one railway company, 
these companies had two options for dealing with local competitors. They could 
choose to cooperate by sharing a station, which meant that their roads were 
connected to each other and passengers could change trains from one 
company to another in that station. It also implied that they had to coordinate on 
fares, schedules and accounting systems. They could use the other company’s 
roads to transport freight in their own trains, and could sell train tickets from one 
of their stations to a final destination served by their partner. 
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In the case that they chose not to cooperate, they operated from different 
stations in the same city1 and their roads did not connect to each other. They 
did not have to coordinate on any managerial aspect, but the lack of 
cooperation was likely to derive in more intense rivalry. 
I collected data on the market contacts of railway companies for each year 
from the maps in the Latorre (1893-1935) directories and from the information 
on every road contained in García Raya (2006) and Muñoz Rubio (2006). 
My variables are then based on the number of places in which an 
organization has market contacts with others: if these market contacts are of 
cooperative nature, i.e. if the companies connect to each other in at least a 
station, I consider them to be engaged in (direct) cooperation; if these contacts 
are non-cooperative, I consider the organizations as rivals, or direct 
competitors. I obtain for the full period of analysis the number of 5148 
connection points-year and 3590 direct competition points-year. The balance 
between these two numbers shows that the railway companies in my sample 
could choose between the two strategies, and that although cooperation was 
more frequent, it was not systematically preferred. 
Because the number of connections is equal to 1 for a majority of 
organizations, as it appears in Figure 2, and the variability tends to be 
concentrated on whether a railway company had 0, 1 or more than 1 
connection, I build, instead of a discrete variable counting the number of 
connections, two dummy variables: “number of connections = 1” and “number of 
connections > 1”, with organizations with no connections being the omitted 
                                                          
1
 Since some stations consisted of a precarious wooden building on the side of a track (Muñoz 
Rubio, 2006), I do not believe that the decision to build a station or not was driven by the 
amount of capital available for investment. 
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category. For direct competition, I count the number of direct competitors for 
each company.  
 
Figure 2: Histogram of the number of connections in the Spanish 
railway population, 1848-1935. 
 
Control variables 
I include the density variable along with the direct competition and 
cooperation variables in order to test for the persistence of diffuse processes 
after accounting for direct effects. Density is operationalized in the usual way, 
as the number of organizations in the population for any given year (Carroll & 
Hannan, 1989). Because I want to be sure that I am assessing the processes of 
diffuse competition and legitimation, I measure density for a specific form, i.e. 
generalist of specialist, instead of the density for the full population. In that way, 
I try to avoid capturing effects that may be correlated with density at the 
population level (e.g., political cycles) but do not directly relate with the 
processes that I intend to measure. The squared term for form density is also 
included, as a curvilinear relation has been observed in the majority of studies 
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conducted over diverse populations (see Carroll & Hannan, 2000, for a review 
of these studies). 
I distinguish in my population between generalists and specialists based on 
the roads that they operate. In this setting, with a few exceptions all companies 
transported both passengers and freight, so that it does not make sense to base 
the distinction between generalists and specialists on service type. Instead, I 
consider that generalists are those organizations that serve regions of the 
resource space that are rich in resources, i.e. those that connect areas of major 
economic activity. In order to distinguish between roads of major importance 
and others, I use an external source, the reports of the Spanish Railway 
Commission formed by engineers and members of the parliament. 
These reports define the roads that were of high priority for the economic 
development of Spain, and ought to be built before any other. Roads that were 
considered of high priority were those connecting two or more large cities or 
important economic centers such as ports. For example, railroads between 
Madrid and all major cities (Barcelona, Zaragoza or Valencia) or important ports 
like Bilbao or Cadiz were all included in the Railway Commission lists. Because 
of the economic importance of these axes, the potential demand for these 
railroads was much higher that the demand for railroads serving points without 
these characteristics. The priority plans defined by this Commission are 
described in Artola (1978). However, the roads were not built in the order 
established by these plans due to corruption and political turmoil. Thus, the 
priority plans only give us information on the potential demand for these roads, 
and being included in these plans is not necessarily correlated with other factors 
such as earlier founding or obtaining subsidies for building that could bias my 
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results. I consider a railway company to be a generalist if it operates one or 
more of the roads included in the priority plans, and a specialist if none of its 
roads is part of a priority plan. This variable varies over time for the companies: 
a company is only considered as a generalist after the road included in a priority 
plan is built, and not for its full history. The evolution of the density of generalists 
and specialists during my period of analysis is represented in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: Density of Spanish railway companies by organizational form, 
1848-1935 
 
 
I also include a number of control variables, such as the natural logarithm of 
age which controls for temporal dependence, the natural logarithm of the 
number of passengers, to control for organizational size2, obtained from Latorre 
directories (1893-1935), the Gaceta de los Caminos de Hierro and the Revista 
de los Caminos de Hierro. I also include the log of the Gross Domestic Product 
                                                          
2
 In fact, I measure size as ln(number of passengers+1) to avoid dropping a few cases with zero 
passengers in a specific year, for example before a company started passenger transportation. 
The number of passengers is very strongly correlated with other variables such as income or 
tons of freight transported, but it has less missing observations. 
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for each year, which captures economic cycles, from Carreras and Tafunell 
(2005). 
Table 1 displays the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum 
values, and correlations for the variables included in my model. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. #connections=1 
0.35 0.48 0.00 1.00 
1.00 
 
        
2. #connections>1 
0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 
-0.66 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
       
3. Direct competition 
1.81 3.91 0.00 28.00 
-0.17 
(0.00) 
0.16 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
      
4. Form density 
 
44.58 24.01 1.00 74.00 
0.21 
(0.00) 
-0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.21 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
     
5. Form density 2 /10 
 
256.35 203.98 0.10 547.60 
0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
0.99 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
    
6. Age (Log) 
 
2.78 0.92 0.00 4.42 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.20 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
0.18 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
   
7. GDP (Log) 
 
15.51 0.32 14.65 15.98 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.12 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.63 
(0.00) 
0.63 
(0.00) 
0.45 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
  
8. Passengers (Log) 
 
12.32 1.93 0.00 17.23 
-0.19 
(0.00) 
0.29 
(0.00) 
0.47 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.13 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
 
9. Specialist 
0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 
0.20 
(0.00) 
-0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.28 
(0.00) 
0.79 
(0.00) 
0.74 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
(0.00) 
0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.30 
(0.00) 
1.00 
 
 
RESULTS 
The population of Spanish railway companies was formed of 146 
organizations, 68 of which disappeared over the 1848-1935 period (45 were 
acquired and 23 failed). The results of the estimation of the effects of direct and 
diffuse interorganizational relationships on the competing risks of failure or 
acquisition are presented in Table 2. 
My results support H1a which states that connections between firms reduce 
the probability of failure, although this effect only appears when the number of 
connections becomes higher: the second column of Table 2 shows a negative 
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effect of connections on the probability of failure, but only for organizations with 
more than one connection. When the number of connections is equal to 1, the 
effect fails to be significant. 
 
Table 2: Multinomial logit regression table of the probability of mortality 
for Spanish railway companies, 1848-1935 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES Dies=1 (acquisition) 
Dies=2 
(failure) 
#connections=1 1.318** -0.760 
 (0.589) (0.577) 
#connections>1 1.446** -1.136* 
 (0.586) (0.640) 
Direct competition -0.160* -0.0697 
 (0.0879) (0.0979) 
Form density -0.0886** 0.660* 
 (0.0399) (0.342) 
Form density 2 /10 0.00828* -0.0547** 
 (0.00454) (0.0263) 
Age (Log) 0.194 0.730* 
 (0.212) (0.400) 
GDP (Log) -1.356* 6.535*** 
 (0.767) (1.642) 
Passengers (Log) 0.240* -0.175 
 (0.140) (0.113) 
Specialist 0.815* -10.22* 
 (0.489) (5.976) 
Constant 13.21 -116.7*** 
 (11.62) (26.64) 
Observations 3595 
Log-likelihood -334.6 
Df 18 
Chi2 92.06 
Standard errors in parentheses  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Similarly, H1b, on the positive effect of connections on the probability of 
acquisition, is supported: in the first column of Table 2 showing the probability of 
acquisition, the connection variables display a positive coefficient. In this case, I 
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find stronger support for H1b since the effect is significant even for a single 
connection, and is stronger when the number of connections increases. 
The effect of direct competition is only significant on the probability of 
acquisition, which it decreases, while it does not affect the probability of failure.3 
These results could be related to the specific nature of my dataset: in my 
setting, having a large number of direct competitors could indicate that a firm 
operates in an area that is richer in resources and which carrying capacity is 
higher. However, I cannot measure the carrying capacities of the different 
niches in this setting and thus cannot directly test this intuition. While intense 
competition is likely to increase the probability of failure and acquisition, the 
effect of drawing on a richer niche is the opposite and the resulting net effect is 
hard to predict. 
I also find support for H2, which states that diffuse processes persist after 
controlling for the effect of dyadic ties between firms. Interestingly, I find a 
curvilinear effect of form density on the probability of failure, but I find that the 
linear effect is positive. This means that density increases the probability of 
failure until a point when the effect starts to decrease. This result could indicate 
that after controlling for the effects of cooperation and direct competition, the 
diffuse process that affects population mortality is mainly diffuse competition, 
which increases mortality rates. This is also supported by the opposite effect 
that I find on the probability of acquisition, which is lower when density is low, 
and becomes positive when the density increases. Since the effect of diffuse 
competition on the probability of acquisition is likely to be positive – in 
competitive settings, one strategy for growing and surviving is to acquire 
                                                          
3
 I also tried to include the effect of multipoint competition together with direct competition in our 
model, but it failed to be significant. 
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competitors – this finding is likely to support the idea that diffuse competition 
persists more than legitimation after controlling for direct ecological processes. 
The effect of diffuse processes on the probability of acquisition is much 
lower than on the probability of failure. This explains why population ecologists 
tend to focus on mortality by failure and not by acquisition when they assess 
density-dependent population dynamics. However, even at very low levels, an 
increase in the number of diffuse competitors has a high positive impact on the 
probability of failure, while a change in the intensity of direct competition has no 
significant impact. This shows the importance of combining measures of direct 
and diffuse processes in assessing mortality rates in an organizational 
population. 
My control variables indicate that specialists are less likely to fail and more 
likely to be acquired than generalists. This is consistent with the prediction of 
the resource-partitioning theory (Carroll, 1985). Age significantly affects the 
probability of failure, a result that is also consistent with ecological theory 
(Freeman, Carroll, & Hannan, 1983), but has no effect on the probability of 
acquisition. The fact that age is positively related with the probability of failure 
reflects the “liability of adolescence” (Bruderl & Schussler, 1990) that affects 
firms with a large initial endowment. In the case of railway companies, this is 
consistent with the high investment in fixed assets required to build the roads. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this paper, I estimate the failure and acquisition rates in the population of 
Spanish railway companies between 1848 and 1935 as a function of dyadic 
cooperative and competitive ties and density and the results provide support for 
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my hypotheses. Cooperative ties between members of the organizational 
population increase acquisition rates and decrease failure rates, and these 
effects occur simultaneously with the processes of diffuse competition and 
legitimation at the population level. 
Support for the positive effect of cooperative ties suggests that cooperation 
tends to increase the chances of success in the population that I study, but 
cooperative ties also increase organizations’ attractiveness for acquisition. This 
finding is consistent with the idea that cooperative ties are a form of social 
capital (Burt, 1992) which increases the probability of success of organizations 
involved in partnerships. In the same line of Cattani et al. (2008) who find a 
negative effect of ties to external actors on mortality, I find that ties to 
organizations within the same population also decrease mortality rates. 
An interesting finding which contributes to the debate on the nature of direct 
and diffuse ecological processes is that density significantly affects mortality 
rates after controlling for dyadic ties of both forms – competitive and 
cooperative. This finding provides evidence against the claim that diffuse 
processes are a good approximation of the average of direct processes in a 
population. I find evidence for the assertion that direct and diffuse ecological 
processes are not only of a distinct nature, but also that they act in different 
directions. 
Diffuse processes have little impact on the dynamics of mergers and 
acquisitions in a population but they substantially affect the success or failure of 
population members. Conversely, the effect of direct processes is more 
important on acquisition rates than on failure probabilities. This effect seems to 
indicate that acquisitions and failures are driven by different forces that occur 
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simultaneously in a population and that in order to fully understand population 
dynamics, one should not focus on a single aspect, either dyadic relationships 
or population-level forces, but combine the two perspectives.  
Direct processes are driven by the strategic behavior of individual firms 
which decide on the kind of dyadic relationships that they want to build, while 
diffuse processes depend on the collective behavior of the population or the 
form as a whole. Strategists have focused mostly on the former, while 
population ecologists have explained industrial demography mostly based on 
the latter. My results show that both approaches are important factors in 
explaining the evolution of populations and that it is necessary to jointly capture 
the two. 
This study presents a number of limitations. First, my operationalization of 
cooperative and competitive dyadic ties is specific to the context of the Spanish 
railway industry and could not be extended to different settings. As a 
consequence of this limitation, my results might not be generalizable to different 
contexts. Also, I do not look at the intensity of dyadic relationships, but treat all 
relationships as equal in my analysis. It is likely that the effect of dyadic 
cooperative and competitive ties varies with the strength of such ties. However, 
I could not assess this issue with the data that were available to us. 
To conclude, I suggest that further research on the co-evolution of 
population-level and organizational-level processes is necessary, not only for 
organizational theory development, but also to draw the attention of 
practitioners on processes that transcend the barriers of the organization and 
significantly affect organizational performance. My study provides a step in this 
direction by showing that processes at the population and organizational levels 
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co-exist to shape industrial dynamics. Taking into consideration my findings and 
the limitations of the present study, I call for studies combining direct and diffuse 
processes as drivers of population dynamics across a variety of settings. Future 
research in this area should also look at the effect of varying intensities and 
asymmetries in dyadic relationships on mortality rates. 
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Chapter 3 - The liability of connectedness: Organizational 
forms, network ties and mortality among Spanish railway 
companies, 1848-1935 
 
Research assessing the effect of a firm’s network ties on organizational 
outcomes has shown the theoretical and practical importance of network ties to 
understand firms’ behavior and performance (Lavie, Lechner, & Singh, 2007; 
Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). Most research in this direction has 
explored the effect of ties to partners outside the focal firm’s population as a key 
factor influencing performance. Ties to outsiders have been demonstrated to 
affect innovation (Ahuja, 2000), financial performance (Shipilov, 2005, 2006; 
Shipilov & Li, 2008; Zaheer & Bell, 2005), act as a buffer from environmental 
uncertainty (Miner, Amburgey, & Stearns, 1990) and increase legitimacy 
(Cattani, Ferriani, Negro, & Perretti, 2008), thus reducing mortality rates. 
Yet, in spite of the consensus that cooperative ties - or network ties, 
equivalent in this paper - matter, the specific effects of cooperative ties to 
partners within the same population on organizational outcomes remains 
underexplored. Moreover, while most studies have focused on network ties as a 
determinant of organizational-level outcomes, little is known about the effect of 
ties on population-level dynamics (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000). I 
suggest exploring how the structure of a firm’s cooperative ties to partners 
within the same population affects mortality rates and thus shapes population 
dynamics. 
Because organizations within a population vary depending on their initial 
position in the resource space, cooperative ties to partners placed in different 
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positions may not have similar effects on survival. In this study, I distinguish two 
organizational forms, generalists and specialists, depending on their position in 
the resource space, and assess the effect of cooperative ties between and 
across these organizational forms on survival rates. 
As a setting, I use the population of Spanish railway companies since the 
inception of the industry in the year 1848 until 1935, which is the last year of 
competitive operation before the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and the 
posterior nationalization of the railway service in 1940. This setting is 
particularly useful for testing my arguments because dyadic ties between 
organizations are easy to track since market contact is observable through the 
location of roads and stations. Market contacts between organizations can 
either be of a cooperative or a competitive nature. In this population, 
cooperative ties occur when railway companies share a station in a city, so that 
passengers and freight can pass easily from the roads of one company to those 
of the other, and the companies need to coordinate on fares, schedules and 
other operating matters; competitive dyads are those between companies which 
serve the same city but operate from different stations and do not share tracks. 
My hypotheses focus on the effect of cooperative ties, although I include 
competitive dyads as a control. I predict that initial differences in available 
resources and form identities between generalists and specialists will affect the 
benefits that these organizational forms will derive from cooperation with 
partners of the same or different form. 
In contrast to Barnett and Carroll’s (1987) hypothesis that networks of firms 
have mutualistic interdependences and reduce partners’ mortality, my results 
suggest that connections to an organization of the same form reduce mortality, 
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but the presence of a liability of connectedness increases mortality rates for 
generalists when they engage in cooperative ties with specialists. I also find that 
some ties have an asymmetrical effect on survival chances, since ties across 
forms reduce survival chances for one form (generalist) while they do not affect 
the mortality rates of specialist organizations. These results show that not only 
the existence of ties matters, but that the parties that are connected affect the 
properties of ties: cooperation strategies interact with the initial location of 
organizations in the resource space in determining the resources, legitimacy 
and intensity of competition that affect an organization’s survival chances. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section 
proposes a series of hypotheses linking cooperative ties, the nature of the 
organizations that cooperate and survival chances. The data and methods 
section describes cooperative and competitive dyadic ties in the Spanish 
railway population during its years of competitive operation, from 1848 to 1935, 
discusses the operationalization of my variables and the empirical model used 
in testing these hypotheses. The following section exposes my results. Finally, I 
conclude by discussing the main results, their implications and the limitations of 
the present study. 
 
DYADIC TIES AND SURVIVAL 
Two types of dyadic relationships are suggested to affect the survival 
chances of population members: direct competition – also termed rivalry (Baum 
& Korn, 1996; Hannan & Freeman, 1989) - and cooperation through 
partnerships or alliances. Direct competition occurs between two organizations 
that are “directly identifiable to each other” (Baum & Korn, 1996, p.255) and 
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depends on the overlap of the resources on which they draw (Baum & Singh, 
1994; Hannan & Freeman, 1977; McPherson, 1983). Cooperation occurs when 
two organizations establish relations with each other in order to pursue some 
common goal. 
While many studies have focused on the dynamics of dyadic competition, 
research on the impact of cooperative ties within a population on survival rates 
is underdeveloped. Most studies tend to focus on ties to external actors (e.g. 
Tucker, Singh, & Meinhard, 1990) and find a positive relationship between such 
ties and survival chances as predicted by resource dependence (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) and institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Oliver, 1991). In 
the context on nonprofit organizations failure of young organizations is 
explained as a consequence of their lack of structural embeddedness, because 
ties to external actors are slow to build (Hager, Galaskiewicz, & Larson, 2004). 
Social capital and institutional ties of nonprofit organizations interact with the 
liability-of-newness effect in shaping the demographic evolution of the 
organizational population. Connections to political parties are found to buffer 
Finnish newspapers from environmental turbulences (Miner et al., 1990). 
Similarly, in the context of U.S. feature film producers the degree of connectivity 
and repeatedness of interactions with distributor organizations increase survival 
rates (Cattani et al., 2008). 
An unexplored but potentially critical factor influencing firms’ survival is the 
development of cooperative ties with organizations within the population. As it 
occurs for ties to external actors, these ties may provide firms with additional 
resources that improve performance. Evidence suggests that stable 
interorganizational networks increase access to resources which help reduce 
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mortality rates (Brass, Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004). Also, failure of a 
partner within a population was found to increase mortality rates (Singh & 
Mitchell, 1996). This result suggests that stable cooperative ties have an effect 
in enhancing survival chances. In my setting, cooperation between two railway 
companies is likely to increase the traffic volume of both companies, as it 
facilitates the access of passengers and goods to a higher number of locations. 
Therefore, increased traffic improves financial performance and is expected to 
reduce the probability of failure. 
Nevertheless, depending on firms’ initial resource base and on the 
resources they gain through their partners, cooperative ties may have different 
effects on organizational survival. This is consistent with the result that 
environmental shocks can cause increased or reduced failure rates for 
organizations with collaborative relationships depending on the types of 
relationships that they build (Mitchell & Singh, 1996). While cooperative ties 
within a form are likely to be aimed at benefiting from economies of scale (in the 
case of generalists) or reinforcing legitimacy by strengthening the perception of 
the form identity (mostly for specialists), cooperative ties across forms are more 
likely to be driven by the necessity to span different areas of the resource space 
in order to avoid competitive pressures (Dobrev & Kim, 2006). Because 
generalists operate in a richer resource area than specialists, they have broader 
exchange possibilities previous to establishing connections (Lomi & Pattison, 
2006). In order to gain access to resources, specialists have more incentives to 
engage in cooperative ties with generalists than the opposite. This in turn gives 
generalists greater bargaining power in choosing their partners. 
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Another consequence of cooperative ties between organizations of a 
different form is that they require investments outside their initial niche position 
(i.e., inside or near the center for specialists cooperating with generalists, in the 
peripheral zones of the resource space for generalists connecting to 
specialists). This is a risky strategy because organizations that leave their 
original positions are likely to experience increased selection pressures 
(Dobrev, 2007; Dobrev, Kim, & Hannan, 2001). 
In order to account for the complex relationships between ties, 
organizational form and survival, I develop four hypotheses that describe the set 
of possibilities of cooperation within and across forms: generalists can establish 
cooperative ties with generalists or specialists, and specialists can cooperate 
with other specialists or with generalists. 
 
Cooperative ties between generalists 
Many ecological studies have divided organizational populations by the 
region of the resource space (i.e., center or periphery) in which organizations 
operate, and by their niche-width, defined as the set of social opportunities and 
constraints that are linked to the organization’s location in the resource space 
(Dobrev et al., 2001; Freeman & Hannan, 1983). The basic niche-width model 
distinguishes between two possible forms: generalists, which draw on a wide 
niche and possess slack capacity, and specialists with a narrow niche and 
limited resources in reserve. 
Generalists target the “average” customer located at the center of the 
market (Boone, van Witteloostuijn, & Carroll, 2002), because such positioning 
allows them to cover a large amount of the potential demand. The center of the 
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market thus becomes a crowded spot of the resource space as all the 
generalists aim for the same central position (Carroll, 1985). Consequently, 
prior to cooperative ties, niche overlap between generalists is maximal at the 
center, and localized competition takes its highest value, resulting in increased 
chances of mortality. 
In such conditions, generalists establish cooperative ties with each other to 
reduce the intensity of the competition by agreeing on mutual forbearance 
(Baum & Korn, 1996, 1999). Because fierce competition for the center of the 
market is difficult to sustain and threatens the survival of generalists, 
cooperation is an adequate strategy for organizations that are less able to drive 
all their competitors out of the market, and alliances improve the survival 
chances of both network partners. This strategy has been extensively observed 
in studies of airline alliances, where code-sharing agreements have allowed 
access to the resources and information of partners (Gimeno, 2004). They have 
also led to cooperative pricing – and reduced fares in most cases – and 
increased traffic on the lines on which code-sharing agreements existed 
(Brueckner, 2001; Oum, Park, Kim, & Yu, 2004; Wang, Evans, & Turner, 2004). 
Furthermore, because generalists in the center of the market draw on 
economies of scale (Boone & van Witteloostuijn, 2004; Carroll, 1985; Van 
Witteloostuijn & Boone, 2006) partnerships between generalists allow them to 
increase their scale of operations, thus reducing their costs and increasing their 
financial performance, which also improves long-term survival possibilities. As a 
consequence, I expect the following relationship: 
H1: Cooperative ties between generalists reduce their mortality rates. 
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Cooperative ties between specialists: 
Specialists occupy specific niches which, although narrow, fit better the 
tastes of a group of customers than the standard products or services provided 
by the generalists (Carroll, 1985). Specialists are often found to successfully 
target untapped niches in industries traditionally dominated by large generalists 
benefiting from economies of scale: it is the case of microbreweries (Carroll & 
Swaminathan, 1992, 2000), farm wineries (Swaminathan, 2001) or point-to-
point airline carriers (Seidel, 1997). The identity of specialists has been 
highlighted as a determinant cause of their success: they are characterized by 
authenticity, i.e. commitment to their clientele (Baron, 2004) and their strength 
lies in their ability to defend their identity and to market their products or 
services as more beneficial to the customers than those of generalists. This 
identity is often related to specific production modes and/or a strong regional 
identity (e.g. Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000). Because of the influence of 
specialists’ form identity on their survival, and on the impact of collective action 
on the creation of this identity, specialists act together in a way that is similar to 
social movements in order to increase each other’s legitimacy (Hannan, Pólos, 
& Carroll, 2007; Swaminathan, 2001). 
Collaborative relationships between specialists speed the legitimation 
process: partnerships are likely to reduce the violations to the form identity by 
increasing the control operated by peers and enabling fast retaliation against 
deviating organizations. Thus, they further reinforce their collective identity. 
Cooperative ties can also reduce the cost of marketing operations aimed at 
increasing audience awareness of the form identity by creating economies of 
scale in these operations, thus easing the acquisition of legitimacy (Hannan et 
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al., 2007; Zuckerman, 1999). As a consequence, the magnitude of the 
legitimation effect that specialists have on each other, which improves survival 
chances, is likely to be larger when they engage in cooperative dyadic ties. 
These arguments lead to the following hypotheses: 
H2: Cooperative ties between specialists reduce their mortality rates. 
 
Cooperative ties across organizational forms: 
Generalists connecting with specialists located in the periphery can gain 
position in niches that are located outside the market center and whose demand 
was previously covered by specialists only. They attempt to do so when the 
competitive pressure in the center of the market becomes too high and when 
they are not able to build an identity that is robust enough to operate 
simultaneously in the center and the periphery (Swaminathan, 2001), usually 
because the cost of offering products that are similar to those of specialists are 
too high (i.e., when segregating processes between generalists and specialists 
are strong). Segregating processes are strong when the technical requirements 
for operating in the center or in the periphery of the resource space are very 
different, as it occurs in the brewery industry (Carroll & Swaminathan, 2000), or 
when the fixed costs of entering into a new market area are high, as it occurs in 
industries requiring important investments in operating infrastructures, such as 
airline carriers or railroads. 
When segregating processes exist, connections between generalists and 
specialists drive generalists away from the center of the market and lead them 
to locate in a near-center position. An organization occupies a near-center 
position if “it has a position of peak appeal that lies outside the market center 
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but its fundamental niche intersects a market center.” (Hannan et al., 2007, p. 
217). Near-center positions are extremely difficult to maintain, because the 
competitive pressure in the center of the market partially affects near-center 
organizations, but at the same time they are driven away from the area that is 
richer in resources (Hannan et al., 2007) because they need to devote a 
significant amount of resources to their relationship with peripheral 
organizations, where resources are scarcer than in the center. Furthermore, 
organizations located in the near-center suffer from the impact of a double 
“violation by comparison” (Dobrev, Ozdemir, & Teo, 2006) with generalists that 
stay in the center and specialists with a strong identity. As a consequence, 
while moving to the near-center of the market can be a successful strategy for 
the few organizations that occupy first the richer niches located in this area, 
most of the generalists moving to a near-center position by connecting to a 
specialist will fail as the result of intense competition, scarcer resources and an 
unstable identity. Moreover, the effect of violation by comparison will be to 
reinforce the identity of generalists that are not connected with specialists and 
increase their survival chances: by contrast, the mortality rates of generalists 
that engage in cooperative ties with specialists will increase (with respect to 
mortality without these ties). 
H3: Cooperative ties between generalists and specialists increase the 
mortality of generalists. 
 
For specialists, the incentive to develop network connections with 
generalists comes from the increase in exchange possibilities that such 
connections enable (Lomi & Pattison, 2006). Cooperative ties improve 
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specialists’ fit in conditions that would otherwise only benefit generalists, such 
as environmental variability (Freeman & Hannan, 1983), by allowing them to 
access fine-grained information on the changing requirements of the market 
and ensuring access to a larger range of relevant resources (Gulati, 1998; Uzzi, 
1996). Thus, enduring cooperative ties with generalists, which possess more 
resources and information, have a larger positive impact on financial 
performance for specialists than for other generalists (Echols & Tsai, 2005). 
Since financial performance positively affects survival chances, and consistent 
with the existence of positive interdependences in survival rates between 
connected generalists and specialists that has been observed in studies of early 
telephone companies (Barnett & Carroll, 1987, 1993), I predict that:  
H4a: Cooperative ties between specialists and generalists reduce the 
mortality of specialists. 
 
However, the social ledger model (Labianca & Brass, 2006) shows that 
embeddedness in a network can create liabilities when negative information is 
conveyed through the network. I know that specialists’ survival is hindered when 
they choose strategies that are associated with a generalist form and thus 
violates the identity characteristics of specialist organizations. In the U.S. wine 
industry where the competitive advantage of farm wineries, i.e. specialists, lies 
in offering estate-bottled wines produced in small quantities and perceived as 
high-quality products, as opposed to the wines of mass producers, the failure 
rates of farm wineries increase when they increase the scale of their operations 
because the adoption of features that consumers associate with lower-quality 
wines is detrimental to specialists (Swaminathan, 2001). 
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Because an organization’s identity is partly determined by its affiliation 
(Blau, 1964; Podolny, 2005) and because compliance with the norms linked to 
their identity is crucial for specialists, the choice of partners will have a strong 
impact on specialists’ legitimacy. The negative effect for specialists of 
cooperating with specialists is particularly important because claims to 
authenticity by specialists are often maintained through a discursive 
confrontation with generalists and the opposition of two schemata (Hannan et 
al., 2007). Thus, because generalists are often stigmatized among specialists 
and their audience, engaging in a cooperative tie with a generalist is likely to 
harm the perception of authenticity of the connected specialist among audience 
members (Pontikes, Negro, & Rao, 2008). The blurring of identity that derives 
from cooperative ties between generalists and specialists would then negatively 
affect their survival chances. These arguments imply that: 
H4b: Cooperative ties between specialists and generalists increase the 
mortality of specialists. 
 
Hypotheses H4a and H4b imply that there could be two effects acting in 
opposite directions in shaping the mortality rates of specialist organizations that 
engage in cooperative ties with generalists. The model that results from my 
hypotheses is presented in Figure 4. 
My theoretical model predicts that cooperative ties within forms increase 
survival chances, but the underlying mechanisms that lead to these hypotheses 
are different: while hypothesis 1 is derived from a decrease in competitive 
intensity between connected generalists, hypothesis 2 reflects an increased 
legitimacy for connected specialists. The effect of cooperative ties across 
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organizational forms is more ambiguous: in the case of generalists, cooperation 
with a different form are predicted to increase mortality, but there could be 
asymmetries in the relation, since the effect of cooperation on specialists’ 
mortality could be negative if H4a is verified or positive (in which case the 
relationship will affect similarly both forms) if H4b is verified. 
 
Figure 4: Theoretical model linking organizational form, cooperative ties 
and mortality rates in organizational populations 
 Cooperative tie to a generalist Cooperative tie to a specialist 
Generalist 
H1: 
Reduced mortality 
H3: 
Increased mortality 
Specialist 
H4a and H4b: 
Undetermined 
H2: 
Reduced mortality 
 
METHODS 
Dyadic ties in the Spanish railway industry, 1848-1935 
In the railway industry, dyadic ties between organizations are easy to track 
because competition and cooperation are determined by the geographical 
location of the companies. Also, because of the regulation of the sector and the 
relevance of railways for the economic and social life of a region, the opening or 
closing of a new railroad are highly salient events and receive intense coverage. 
Cooperation agreements require a long-term commitment to the partnership 
because the infrastructures needed to cooperate are substantial. 
The Spanish railway industry operated under competitive conditions from 
1848, date of the opening of the first railroad in the country, to the summer of 
1936. After this period, railroads were either stalled or destroyed by the Spanish 
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Civil War, and when the war ended in 1939, Franco’s dictatorship decided to 
nationalize most of the companies and to group them into a State-owned 
company that still exist nowadays, RENFE. 
The first Spanish railroads were built before any railway legislation was 
passed: although many European countries had a consolidated railroad system 
by 1848 when the first railroad opened in Spain, railway development was not a 
priority for the conservative government (from the Partido moderado) in office 
from 1843 to 1854. Thus, there were already 8 companies operating in the 
railway industry when the first Railways Law was passed in 1855 by the liberal 
government (Partido progresista). However, a conservative coup brought the 
former government back in place in 1856, and the railway legislation was never 
enforced (Artola, 1978): although the Railways Law determined that all railroads 
ought to have the same gauge (the Spanish standard, defined by Spanish civil 
engineers in 1844, which was different from the European standard), it did not 
keep most railway companies from overlooking this requirement constructing 
railroads of different gauges even after the law was passed. As a consequence 
of this loose regulation and following a similar path as the early British railway 
industry (Wolmar, 2007), the Spanish railway industry was submitted to less 
control than that of nearby countries such as Portugal or France regarding the 
opening of new railroads and the creation of new companies, in particular as far 
as checks on financial viability of the projects were concerned (Dobbin, 1997). 
During the period of this study, the rights to build and exploit railroads were 
assigned by the government through a downward auction mechanism. The 
company that presented the least costly project and required the smallest 
subsidy was granted the right to build a railroad and a 99-year concession for its 
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exploitation. Competitors did not have the right to build a track serving the same 
itinerary but they could serve the same stations indirectly. For example, only 
one company had a direct railroad from Madrid to Zaragoza, but another 
company offered the possibility to go from Madrid to Zaragoza through 
Valladolid and Burgos. When two companies served the same city, they could 
decide to connect their tracks and share a station or to locate in different 
stations and operate independently from each other. 
Formal cooperation agreements were required when two companies shared 
a station and had connected tracks, as they needed to coordinate on schedules 
in order to avoid accidents, on costs derived from the use of the station, and on 
fares, in particular when clients were requiring transportation from a station 
belonging to one of the network partners to a final destination served by the 
other partner and transited by the shared station. In this setting, even when two 
railway companies served two of the same cities and shared stations in both 
places, they could not be considered as competing for passengers and freight 
traveling from and to these stations: although they had different ticket offices, 
the companies used the same buildings, could provide better services (such as 
restaurants or luggage delivery) because they shared the costs of the buildings 
and operations, while companies operating on their own often owned a very 
small station offering only basic services (Tedde de Lorca, 1978). Partner 
companies operated jointly all the services and had agreements to charge 
passengers the same fares. These agreements were very similar to those 
observed in airline code-sharing agreements, in which two companies appear to 
compete by selling tickets for separate flights serving the same routes, but 
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establish agreements to jointly operate on these routes and avoid competing 
with each other (Ito & Lee, 2007). 
When two companies operated from the same city but did not engage in 
formal cooperation, competition between them was more intense, not only when 
they served the same cities, but also when they offered different roads of 
potentially similar characteristics. Similarly to what has happened in the last 
decade with low-cost airlines (Shaw & Thomas, 2006), the availability of flights 
to once-remote locations increased the overall demand for flights. Competition 
between railroads operating from the same city and serving different 
destinations was especially relevant in the case of freight transportation: 
industrial firms operating in a given geographical location were looking for 
railroads serving large cities or ports to supply their products to customers 
outside their region or even abroad, but holding prices constant, they had little 
preferences regarding the port from which their goods were traveling to 
European countries (Artola, 1978). The fact that railways in situations of 
monopoly on specific destinations often lowered their fares to resist competition 
from other railroads serving different geographic points provides evidence 
regarding this competitive situation (Pascual Domènech, 1999). 
The decision to cooperate was not positively related to the distance over 
which companies were in contact: when two companies served the same cities, 
some decided to share stations, but in other cases, they built tracks that 
operated parallel to each other over miles. The most extreme case occurred in 
the Valencia area (Eastern Spain) where two companies had parallel tracks for 
184 km (Vía-Libre, 1993). 
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Thus, in the Spanish railway context, I can consider that organizations that 
shared a station were involved in direct cooperation, while organizations that did 
not share any station but operated from the same stations were directly 
competing. Organizations that did not locate in the same geographic area only 
had a diffuse impact on each other. 
 
Data 
I used an original database including the 146 railway companies that 
operated in Spain at some point during the period 1848-1935. The number of 
railway companies operating in Spain varied between 1 in 1848 and its 
maximum number of 94 in 1928 and the network length reached 16.615 km at 
the end of my time frame. The evolution of the density of railway companies and 
the total railroad length over this period are represented in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5: Total railroad growth in length and density in Spain, 1848-1935 
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I reconstructed the life histories of all the companies operating during this 
period from annual directories of the sector created by Enrique de la Torre (La 
Torre, 1893-1935), an engineer employed at the largest railway company. For 
years previous to 1893 I gathered information from the two weekly journals of 
the industry, the Gaceta de los Caminos de Hierro and the Revista de los 
Caminos de Hierro. The reliability of the data used to build the census was 
cross-checked using two additional sources, on the opening on railroad sections 
since 1848 (García Raya, 2006) and a book on narrow-gauge railways (Muñoz 
Rubio, 2006), both based on primary archival data. 
All of the companies in the Spanish railway population transported 
passengers (although 2 companies in my dataset operated for a few years with 
freight only before including passenger service) and most transported freight as 
well, with the exception of some short-distance suburban companies that were 
dedicated to passenger transportation only. 
 
Variables 
In my model, I distinguished between generalists and specialists based on 
the roads they operated and whether these roads were designed to attract the 
average customer. Data on the economic activity or population in the different 
provinces of Spain is only available for the last years of my study. Since the 
railway industry had an important impact on the development of the regions in 
which railroads were implanted (Gómez Mendoza, 1982; Tortella Casares, 
1995), it is very difficult to make inferences on the population or GDP data for 
the first years of my period of analysis without upward biasing the series for the 
regions that benefited from the early implantation of railway service. 
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Furthermore, I need a more fine-grained measure than data at the provincial 
level, since all railroads going through the richest provinces are not necessarily 
the ones focusing on the average customers: railroads serving an industrial 
area or a thermal city in the Barcelona region have a very different distance with 
respect to the peak of the resource distribution. 
In order to avoid the problems that could be created by relying on data 
collected at the regional level and retrospective analysis, I created my 
generalist/specialist variable for each railroad company by relying on reports 
that were written contemporaneously to railway development in Spain. Here, I 
could approximate the location of the peaks of the resource distribution by 
looking at the roads whose construction was included in listings of railroads of 
high national priority, as defined by the Spanish Railway Commission, formed 
by engineers and members of the parliament. The priority plans defined by this 
Commission were described in Artola (1978). The roads that were considered of 
high priority were those connecting two or more large cities or important 
economic centers such as ports. For example, railroads between Madrid and all 
major cities (Barcelona, Zaragoza or Valencia) or important ports like Bilbao or 
Cadiz were all included among the lines that were of high priority for the 
Railway Commission. Because of the economic importance of these axes, the 
potential demand for these railroads was much higher that the demand for 
railroads serving points without these characteristics. However, the priority 
plans did not imply that the railroads included in them were built first or got more 
subsidies. In the first years of the industry many roads were proposed to auction 
before the ones that were included in the priority plans because of corruption or 
personal interests of the politicians that organized the auction process, and 
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some of the roads that were in such plans did not get built in years after their 
assignation because intense speculation made the shares of the company 
worth more than actually building the roads or because of economic crises or 
difficulties to get funding in a incipient banking system (Artola, 1978; Veiga 
Alonso, 1999). 
Many of the specialist railroads were created with support from provincial 
and local governments, after a strong political opposition to the plans proposed 
by the Spanish Railway Commission. Regions that were not included in these 
plans protested against the increase in regional inequalities that railroads were 
likely to cause if the roads were only built between cities displaying an important 
economic activity, and they actively promoted regional railroads and funded 
them by giving land for their building (Artola, 1978). The arguments that were 
raised at that time against the priority plans show the validity of my reasoning 
considering railroads included in these plans as generalists targeting the center 
of the market, while railroads that were not part of these plans remained in the 
periphery. These specialist railroads generally served smaller cities and 
contributed to the economic development of peripheral regions, and most of 
them operated in only one or a few provinces. 
Some of my theoretical arguments on generalists and specialists are based 
on the existence of different identities for the two organizational forms. The idea 
that railroads excluded from the priority plans became an organizational form 
with a strong identity is reflected in the fact by most of these organizations 
included “Ferrocarriles secundarios” (Secondary Railways) in their names, and 
the fact that the Parliament approved a specific law on secondary railways in 
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1904 (and three more in the following fifteen years) shows the consensus on 
the specificity of that organizational form. 
The information extracted from the Railway Commission reports was at the 
railroad-level, and I distinguished between generalists and specialists by 
aggregating information on all the railroads operated by each company. Thus, a 
generalist is an organization that possesses at least a railroad that is included in 
the priority plans, while a specialist does not operate any of those, either 
because it serves only small cities or because it connects a large city to small 
ones: examples of those are trains connecting Madrid or Barcelona to 
surrounding recreation places and operating mostly on Sundays. Generalists 
defined in that way operated more numerous and more lengthy roads than 
specialists: generalists operated on average 4.4 roads for an average length of 
569.3 km served, while the average number of roads for specialists was 1.1, 
with an average length of 51.5 km. Figure 3 (p.26 in Chapter 2) shows the 
evolution of densities by organizational form from 1848 to 1935. 
I then included in my model four dummy variables, indicating the existence 
of connections from a generalist to a generalist, from a generalist to a specialist, 
from a specialist to a specialist and from a specialist to a specialist. As 
mentioned in the introduction, cooperative ties exist between railway companies 
that agree on operating from the same station and coordinating on schedules, 
fares and use of tracks, while direct competition (included as a control variable) 
is observed when two railway companies operate from the same city but from 
different stations. When two organizations operated from the same city, they 
chose to cooperate in approximately 59% of the cases, and to compete in about 
41% of them. 
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I used a dummy variable because the number of connections was equal to 
0 or 1 for a majority of organizations, as it appears in Figure 2 (p.24 in Chapter 
2). Furthermore, the total number of connections was more correlated than the 
dummy variable to the organization’s size and to total density, which increase 
the opportunities of finding network partners. 
 
Controls 
In line with most previous ecological studies, I included a series of 
environmental and organizational control variables. Organizational size was 
measured by the logarithm of the total number of passengers that used the 
company’s roads each year, and organizational age was measured by the 
logarithm of the time (in years) since the opening of a company’s first railroad. I 
took into account the date of opening because many of the railroads that were 
assigned through auctions never got built, or the companies that owned the 
rights for its exploitation sold it before the opening, either once the railroad was 
built or during its construction, so that I could not use the concession date as an 
indicator of operation in the railway industry. 
I also controlled for the existence of non-cooperative dyadic ties with other 
companies for each organization, by indicating whether they were operating 
from cities in which different railway companies competed for customers and did 
not cooperate. I indicated the existence of direct competition by a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 when a railway company operated from a city in 
which at least another company was present and did not cooperate with the 
focal firm and 0 otherwise. Similarly to what I do for cooperative dyadic ties, I 
use a dummy variable because in over 67% of the cases, railway companies 
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had either zero or one direct competitor. However, using the count of direct 
competitors did not substantially modify my results. 
Among the environmental variables, I controlled for the effect of crowding 
and legitimation effects in the population, measured through population density 
in any given year. In some of the models I used form density instead of total 
density in order to account for the fact that legitimation and competition effects 
seemed to be more intense within a form than across forms (see for example, 
Dobrev et al., 2006; Kuilman & Li, 2009). 
I also included an indicator of the economic activity in the country (Carroll & 
Delacroix, 1982), the logarithm of the Gross Domestic Product in millions of 
pesetas (the Spanish currency at that time). This series was taken from 
Carreras and Tafunell (2005) and was expressed in constant currency with 
respect to the GDP of year 1995. 
 
Model 
I treated as failures the cases in which an organization ran out of business 
or was acquired by the state, while exits due to acquisition by a competitor were 
treated as right-censored. The decision to consider acquisition by the State as 
failures was consistent with discussions of the role of the State in the railway 
industry (Artola, 1978) which took control of some railroads whose existence 
was important for the citizens, but were not profitable, and gradually increased 
its intervention in the railway industry, ending with the nationalization of most of 
the companies after the Civil War (Ortuñez, 2004). 
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I then evaluated the probability of failure through a Cox proportional-hazard 
model of the form: h(t) = h0(t)eβ1x1+…+βkxk, where h0 is the baseline hazard rate 
and the x’s are the covariates. 
I estimated four different models: the first two models were baseline 
models, with only the control variables as covariates explaining failure rates, 
while the two last models included the four connection variables. 
 
RESULTS 
The population of Spanish railway companies was formed of 146 
organizations, 23 of which failed over the 1848-1935 period while 36 more 
disappeared through acquisition. 
The means, standard deviations, minimum, maximum and correlations 
among the variables used in my models are shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. Age (log) 2.70 0.95 0.00 4.42 1.00          
2. Form 
density 
43.92 24.00 1.00 74.00 0.21 
(0.00) 
1.00         
3. Total 
density 
68.13 24.23 1.00 94.00 0.44 
(0.00) 
1.00         
4. Generalist 
connected to 
a generalist 
0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.66 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
1.00       
5. Generalist 
connected to 
a specialist 
0.13 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.18 
(0.00) 
-0.45 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
(0.00) 
0.64 
(0.00) 
1.00      
6. Specialist 
connected to 
a generalist 
0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00 -0.02 
(0.22) 
0.49 
(0.00) 
0.23 
(0.00) 
-0.51 
(0.00) 
-0.35 
(0.00) 
1.00     
7. Specialist 
connected to 
a specialist 
0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 0.09 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
-0.29 
(0.00) 
-0.20 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
1.00    
8. 
Passengers 
(log) 
12.32 1.93 0.00 17.23 0.24 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
0.30 
(0.00) 
0.39 
(0.00) 
-0.18 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
1.00   
9. GDP (Log) 15.48 0.33 14.59 15.98 0.46 
(0.00) 
0.66 
(0.00) 
0.88 
(0.00) 
-0.12 
(0.00) 
-0.04 
(0.01) 
0.22 
(0.00) 
0.19 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00  
10. Direct 
competition 
0.47 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.14 
(0.00) 
-0.01 
(0.74) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.06 
(0.00) 
0.17 
(0.00) 
-0.38 
(0.00) 
0.04 
(0.00) 
0.34 
(0.00) 
0.05 
(0.00) 
1.00 
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The percentage of organizations that are connected to a competitor is 25% 
for generalists connected to generalists, 13% for generalists connected to 
specialists, 45% for specialists connected to generalists and 20% for specialists 
connected to specialists. 
 
Table 4: Estimates for the Cox proportional hazard model of mortality 
rates in the Spanish railway industry (1848-1935) 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 
 
Model 4 
Age (Log) 0.77** 
(0.31) 
0.79*** 
(0.33) 
0.96*** 
(0.34) 
0.94*** 
(0.34) 
Form density -0.01 
(0.01) 
 -0.01 
(0.02) 
 
Total density  0.29*** 
(0.08) 
 0.26*** 
(0.08) 
Generalist connected to a generalist   -2.30** 
(1.11) 
-1.98* 
(1.02) 
Generalist connected to a specialist   2.17** 
(1.01) 
2.18** 
(1.02) 
Specialist connected to a generalist   -0.67 
(0.61) 
-0.68 
(0.60) 
Specialist connected to a specialist   -2.24** 
(1.03) 
-2.24** 
(1.02) 
Passengers (Log)  -0.21*** 
(0.08) 
-0.19*** 
(0.08) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
GDP (Log) -24.58*** 
(8.94) 
-36.73*** 
(10.18) 
-22.55** 
(9.05) 
-33.52*** 
(9.88) 
Direct competition -0.44 
(0.43) 
-0.47 
(0.43) 
-0.96** 
(0.48) 
-0.96** 
(0.49) 
Number of subjects 
 
146 146 146 146 
Number of failures 
 
23 23 23 23 
Log-pseudolikelihood 
 
-95.67 -95.97 -88.19 -88.18 
Wald Chi2 
 
23.28*** 27.09*** 32.39*** 36.96*** 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The results are presented in Table 4. The proportional hazards assumption 
was tested using the robust variance-covariance matrix and was supported in 
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the four models. Model 1 and 2 are the baseline models for organizational 
mortality. In Model 1, I consider for each form the density of similar 
organizations as the determinant of organizational failure, while in model 2, I 
use total organizational density as a variable explaining railway companies’ 
failure rates. Form density does not significantly affect failure rates, while total 
density significantly increases mortality, but model 1 provides a slightly better fit 
than model 2 (Log-pseudolikelihood = -95.67 for model 1 and -95.97 for model 
2). In models 3 and 4, I introduce the cooperative ties variables together with 
the form density and total density variables in order to test my hypotheses and 
this significantly increases the fit of my models. 
Hypothesis 1, which states that connections between generalists reduce 
their mortality, is supported in models 3 and 4. The effect is more significant in 
the model using the form density (p<0.05) than in the model using the total 
density variable, where it is only marginally significant (p<0.10). The hypothesis 
stating that connections between specialists reduce their mortality rates is also 
supported in models 3 and 4. In both cases, I find a negative coefficient with 
high statistical significance (p<0.05). 
The hypothesis that cooperative ties between generalists and specialists 
increase the mortality of specialists, hypothesis 3, is also supported. In models 
3 and 4, the “generalist connected to a specialist” variable displays a statistically 
significant (p<0.05) positive coefficient. However, H4a and H4b fail to be 
supported: connections between generalists and specialists have a negative but 
non-significant effect on the mortality of specialists. 
The fact that neither H4a nor H4b are supported could actually indicate that 
both hypotheses are simultaneously supported, and the non significant negative 
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sign could show that the magnitude of the effect predicted by H4a, i.e. reduced 
mortality, is slightly larger than that of H4b, which predicts that specialists 
cooperating with generalists will experience higher mortality. This would show 
that the increased financial performance of specialists affects their long-term 
survival more positively than the blurring of identity harms survival chances. 
Nonetheless, since I cannot disentangle the two effects and I find no significant 
relationship between cooperative ties of a specialist to a generalist, I cannot 
assess these effects more precisely. 
My results also show that mortality rates increase with organizational age. 
This is consistent with the “liability-of-adolescence” proposed by Brüderl and 
Schussler (1990) for firms with an important initial resource endowment – which 
is the case for railway companies, starting with large fixed assets – and 
supported by other empirical findings (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991; Henderson, 
1999). I also find a negative effect of size, measured by the number of 
passengers, on mortality rates, a result that has been found in many ecological 
studies (see Carroll & Hannan, 2000, for a summary). Economic prosperity also 
relates positively to survival, as the negative sign associated with GDP in 
mortality models 1 to 4 shows. The fact that the coefficient is larger and has 
more statistical significance in models 2 and 4, i.e. when associated with total 
density, can be explained by the correlation between total density and GDP. 
This correlation is due to the high economic impact that the development of the 
railway industries had on economic growth over the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries, as the railway sectors grew larger (e.g., Foreman-Peck, 2003; 
Hawke, 1970). 
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Total density significantly increases mortality rates: when there is crowding 
in the Spanish railway population, failure rates increase in models 2 and 4. 
However, the effect of form density on failure rates is not significant, neither in 
the baseline model (model 1) nor in the model including the connection 
variables (model 3)4. This could indicate that in the early railway industry, 
legitimation and competition processes were not only operating within forms but 
also outside the boundaries of a single organizational form and that it is 
necessary to account for the pressures created by other organizations in the 
population. 
The direct competition variable is not significant in the baseline models 
(models 1 and 2), when the connection variables are omitted. This result is not 
surprising since I only account for competitive contacts in these models. Since 
many organizations had competitive and cooperative market contacts with 
different – and in some instances, with the same – organizations, restricting the 
measure of market contacts to competitive contacts increases the errors and 
reduces the statistical significance of the effect. However, the direct competition 
variable maintains its negative sign but becomes significant in models 3 and 4, 
when I include the connection variables. This effect is consistent with the 
literature on interfirm rivalry (Baum & Korn, 1996) which shows that direct 
competition increases mutual forbearance. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The setting of the Spanish railway population allows for a straightforward 
measurement of competitive and cooperative market contacts between all 
operating firms. In this study, after controlling for the effects of population 
                                                          
4
 Including the quadratic terms for total density and form density did not change these results. 
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density and competitive ties between organizations, I find that different types of 
ties create different benefits and liabilities for the connected companies. In 
particular, I find that cooperative ties between organizations of the same form 
increase their survival chances, while cooperative ties between organizations of 
different forms do not: cooperative ties between generalists and specialists 
increase the mortality of generalists, and do not significantly reduce mortality 
rates for specialists. 
These findings show the importance of disentangling the effect of 
connections on organizational mortality for different forms and different types of 
connections. While many studies aggregating connections of different types 
have found that they decrease mortality, I show that a more fine-grained 
classification of connections, by the type of organizations to which they connect, 
partly contradicts this picture. In some instances, there is a liability of 
connectedness: generalists connecting to specialists experience a significant 
rise in their probability of failure. I also find that some ties can have an 
asymmetric effect on both partners: connections between generalists and 
specialists increase the mortality for the generalist, and do not have such effect 
for the specialist partner. This asymmetry shows that it is important to consider 
carefully the properties of different network ties in assessing their role on 
mortality or other types of performance outcomes. 
The finding that connections between generalists have a negative effect on 
their mortality rates shows that partnerships that allow partners to benefit from 
economies of scale and that favor mutual forbearance at the center of the 
market are beneficial. The negative effect of connections between specialists on 
their mortality rates, however, is likely to be mainly due to a legitimation effect 
 68 
and not to a moderation in the intensity of competition. Specialists tend to 
occupy specific niches and, especially in the Spanish railway context, do not 
significantly overlap with each other. As a consequence, strategies aimed at 
mitigating competition from other specialists make little sense and have a small 
impact on survival chances, while the legitimation effects that they have on 
each other can spread over larger geographic areas, as reported in previous 
studies (Bigelow, Carroll, Seidel, & Tsai, 1997). 
The result that connections between generalists and specialists increase 
their failure rates, shows the increased mortality experienced by organizations 
that locate in a near-center position (Hannan et al., 2007). This effect relates to 
the increased mortality experienced by middle-sized organizations as described 
by Meyer (1990) in the following terms: “large organizations capture the 
advantages of generalism and small organizations the advantages of 
specialism, leaving organizations in the middle range of size with the liabilities 
of both” (p.304). I believe that this is the situation experienced by near-center 
organizations, but that this effect does not depend on their size, but rather on 
their location in the resource space and the advantages and liabilities 
associated with this location. 
I need further research to disentangle the effects of connections between 
generalists and specialists on specialists’ mortality. It is likely that the positive 
effect on financial performance and the negative effect on identity that these 
connections create simultaneously determine mortality rates, and I also know 
that financial performance increases survival chances. I provide some 
preliminary evidence on the importance to evaluate trade-offs between different 
performance outcomes, survival and financial returns, when building networks 
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of interorganizational cooperation. This is similar to the result that structural 
holes in networks exert simultaneous and opposite influences on different 
performance outcomes, which in turn interact with each other (Shipilov & Li, 
2008). However, I believe that the finding that connections between generalists 
and specialists have an asymmetric effect on the mortality of the two forms is 
important. 
This study presents a number of limitations. Firstly, connections between 
two organizations were measured in my database as a binary variable taking 
value 0 or 1 (if the organizations are connected). Thus, my model only accounts 
for the existence of connections, but not for their intensity. A second limitation 
comes from the difficulty to generalize the measures of dyadic ties to other 
settings. While I chose this industry because the measurement of cooperative 
and dyadic ties was straightforward in the railway setting, I acknowledge that 
the replication of this study in other settings may be difficult. Finally, I could not 
account for differences in regulation over the period of study: historical accounts 
of the creation of the Spanish railway industry are consistent in showing that the 
differences between the formal legal system and the rules that actually applied 
to railways were extremely important, because of the endemic corruption in 
Spain during these years. Indeed, I conducted a series of tests that show no 
effect of railway policy on mortality rates in the Spanish context, as opposed to 
the results observed in the U.S. railroad industry (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997, 2000) 
 
CONCLUSION 
This study contributes to research in strategy by measuring the effect of 
cooperative relationships on mortality rates in an organizational population. 
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While most studies tend to consider that external relationships enhance firms’ 
access to resources and performance, I have shown that external relationships 
are not always effective as a buffer from environmental uncertainties, and that 
there exists a liability of connectedness under certain conditions. I also find that 
when ties are created between organizations of a different form, they have an 
asymmetrical effect on the organizations that are involved. These results have 
important implications for strategy theorists and practitioners, as they lead to 
reformulate the claim that network ties are a good mechanism to deal with 
environmental uncertainty (e.g., Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and creates 
mutualism that leads to enhanced survival chances (Barnett & Carroll, 1987): 
my results suggest that it is not always the case, and that the risks of 
involvement into an interorganizational cooperative network in terms of financial 
performance and of survival need to be carefully assessed. 
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Chapter 4 - Exploring the link between coopetitive strategies, 
industry structure and firm performance 
 
The existence of complex relationships between firms that get 
simultaneously involved in cooperation and competition with each other has 
been recently acknowledged by strategy researchers and referred to as 
coopetition (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996). While the first studies within the 
coopetition framework claimed that coopetitive strategies provided superior 
benefits with respect to purely competitive or cooperative strategies (e.g., 
Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996) through a 
decreased intensity in competition and collusion (Greve & Mitsuhashi, 2004), 
very few empirical studies have tested the performance implications of 
coopetition (Luo, Rindfleisch, & Tse, 2007; Ritala, Hallikas, & Sissonen, 2008). 
Furthermore, while different types of coopetitive relationships have been 
identified depending on the intensity and balance of competition and 
cooperation within the relationship (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999, 2000; Ritala et al., 
2008), the performance consequences that they entail have not yet been 
investigated. 
In this paper, I examine the effects on financial performance of different 
coopetitive strategies, depending on whether they are dominated by coopetition 
or cooperation, and study how characteristics of the industry affect the benefits 
that can be derived from these strategies. I rely on a large dataset including all 
the relationships between organizations in the Spanish railway industry over 
nearly 90 years. The existence of network externalities that create positive 
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interdependences between competitors in this industry makes the analysis of 
coopetitive strategies particularly relevant. 
I contribute to the literatures in strategy and industrial dynamics by showing 
the performance implications of various mixes of cooperation and competition 
under different industry structures. My findings show that the effect of different 
coopetitive strategies on profitability depends on the crowding of the market: 
while competition-dominated strategies are in general more profitable than 
cooperation-dominated strategies, this difference decreases as population 
density increases. An additional contribution of this paper is that I examine the 
complete set of relationships between firms within an industry, while most 
studies on coopetition have focused on case studies or on a sample of large 
and successful firms. The data set used here brings us the opportunity to 
conduct a more extensive analysis of the consequences of coopetition at the 
industry level. 
 
COOPETITIVE STRATEGIES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Coopetition has been described as a situation in which value is created 
through simultaneous management of cooperation and competition (Bengtsson 
& Kock, 2000; Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996). This framework was 
developed in order to highlight the potential benefits of cooperating with 
competitors (Nalebuff & Brandenburger, 1996). 
Coopetition has been held responsible for a variety of beneficial outcomes 
such as added value and higher pricing (Dozoretz & Matanovich, 2002) or 
higher quality and productivity which increase profitability (Bucklin & Sengupta, 
1993; Lado, Boyd, & Hanlon, 1997; Walley, 2007). However, while the drivers of 
 82 
coopetition between organizations have been discussed in a variety of studies 
(Gnyawali, He, & Madhavan, 2006; Luo, Shenkar, & Gurnani, 2008), very few 
have empirically examined its actual effects on performance (Luo et al., 2007) 
or the possible downsides of coopetition (Afuah, 2000; Bonel, Pellizzari, & 
Rocco, 2008; Bonel & Rocco, 2007). Among these, only asymmetric learning 
and value appropriation between opportunistic partners in knowledge-related 
alliances have received important attention (Dussauge, Garrette, & Mitchell, 
2000; Hamel, 1991; Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 
1998; Mitchell, Dussauge, & Garrette, 2002). 
One of the main issues in previous coopetition studies is the generalizability 
of their findings, for two major reasons. Firstly, empirical studies of coopetition 
have been based on a very small number of cases (Bengtsson & Kock, 1999, 
2000; Bonel & Rocco, 2007) or on samples of large salient companies (Ritala et 
al., 2008). In order to draw conclusions on the effect of coopetitive strategies on 
performance, I need to use a large number of cases representing the full set of 
firms operating in an industry. Secondly, the term coopetition encompasses a 
great variety of relationships but financial performance will differ depending on 
the intensity of cooperation and competition and the balance between them in a 
given relationship (Ritala et al., 2008). Investigation of the social structure of 
coopetition and its effects on performance has been limited to a few studies of 
intra-organizational (Luo, Slotegraaf, & Pan, 2006; Tsai, 2002) or within-team 
(Beersma, Hollenbeck, Humphrey, Moon, Conlon, & Ilgen, 2003) relationships. 
It is important to distinguish between coopetitive strategies based on the 
intensity of cooperation and competition in order to show that differences in the 
type of strategy adopted lead to different performance implications. 
 83 
The most obvious examples of the benefits of coopetition between 
independent organizations can be found in complementary industries such as 
cars and insurances, or microprocessors and software, but coopetition can also 
be an interesting strategy within a single industry. In particular, coopetitive 
strategies characterize markets that display network externalities, as in the 
railway industry (Fjeldstad, Becerra, & Narayanan, 2004). When there are 
network externalities between organizations operating in the same industry, it is 
necessary to consider cooperative strategies as coopetitive games where the 
partners cooperate on some aspects but compete on others (Padula & Dagnino, 
2007). In the context of Spanish railways, firms cooperated in a specific location 
by sharing a station but they also competed inside the station for the same 
customers and companies. However, competition between companies also 
generated positive network externalities, because market demand increased 
with the size of the network as more destinations were becoming available for 
passengers. 
In settings characterized by network externalities, where competition 
between firms can have a positive effect on the profitability of all the actors in 
the sector because it increases the attractiveness of the market, determining 
the relative importance of cooperation or competition in a relationship is 
particularly relevant. Distinguishing coopetitive strategies that are cooperation-
dominated or competition-dominated (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000) allows 
determining the conditions under which coopetition is beneficial. Competing on 
some activities while cooperating on others has been shown to be the most 
beneficial strategy in logistic relationships (Klein, Rai, & Straub, 2007) but the 
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ideal balance of cooperation and competition is likely to depend on the 
characteristics of the industry. 
In the presence of network externalities, it may be the case that in early 
stages, strategies aimed at expanding the network and tapping structural holes 
while they exist are more profitable (Zaheer & Bell, 2005). Competitive moves 
also lead to increased performance when they are made at early stages of the 
industry and influence the technological standard (Arthur, 1989; Leiponen, 
2008) but moves aimed at setting standards become less likely once the 
network has reached its critical mass (Economides, 1996). 
When market penetration is low, having loose relationships with partners 
can provide advantages: while both partners expand their area of operations 
independently, they do not fully commit to each other and maintain bargaining 
power because they can withdraw from the relationship if it is not profitable and 
influence the evolution of the network before it becomes stable. This strategy is 
important in order to search for new partners when there are few available 
firms, especially in early stages when there is no information on the reputation 
of new actors. Loose relationships allow partners to gain information on the 
trustworthiness of the other part. 
Furthermore, when the market becomes crowded, the objective changes 
from attracting new customers to getting more profit from existing customers. As 
the sector grows at lower rates, competition between actors becomes more 
aggressive (Ferrier, 2001) and hypercompetition makes competitive advantages 
harder to sustain (Schumpeter, 1942; Wiggins & Ruefli, 2005). Under these 
conditions, coopetitive strategies that are dominated by competition are difficult 
to maintain: firms will not accept aggressive competitive moves from their 
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partners and will be less willing to cooperate unless they perceive a full 
commitment from their allies. As a consequence, the benefits of competition-
dominated strategies decrease as the market becomes more crowded.  
This leads to the following hypothesis: 
H1: Coopetitive strategies that are dominated by competition are more 
profitable when market penetration is low than when the market is crowded. 
 
When market penetration is higher, the overall network becomes more 
stable and cooperation is important because it allows for an increase of profit 
margins through an intensification of transaction and capacity utilization 
(Fjeldstad et al., 2004) and a reduction of the average cost through economies 
of scale. When density gets higher, more information can flow between 
partners, and the quality of the information exchanged will be higher between 
partners engaged in tighter relationships. Furthermore, strategies that are 
dominated by cooperation can be a buffer against the surrounding competitive 
aggressiveness. As a consequence, I expect that: 
H2: Coopetitive strategies that are dominated by cooperation are more 
profitable when the market is crowded than when market penetration is low. 
 
SETTING 
In the railway industry, competition and cooperation strategies between 
organizations are easy to track: because of the regulation of the sector and the 
relevance of railways for the economic and social life of a region, the opening or 
closing of a new railroad are highly salient events and receive intense coverage. 
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Cooperation agreements require a long-term commitment to the partnership 
because the infrastructures needed to cooperate are substantial. 
The Spanish railway industry operated under competitive conditions from 
1848, date of the opening of the first railroad in the country, to the summer of 
1936. After this period, railroads were either stalled or destroyed by the Spanish 
Civil War, and when the war ended in 1939, Franco’s dictatorship decided to 
nationalize most of the companies and to group them into a State-owned 
company that still exist nowadays, RENFE. 
During the period of this study, the rights to build and exploit railroads were 
assigned by the government through a downward auction mechanism. The 
company that presented the least costly project and required the smallest 
subsidy was granted the right to build a railroad and a 99-year concession for its 
exploitation. Competitors did not have the right to build a track serving the same 
itinerary but they could serve the same stations indirectly. For example, only 
one company had a direct railroad from Madrid to Zaragoza, but another 
company offered the possibility to go from Madrid to Zaragoza through 
Valladolid and Burgos. When two companies served the same city, they could 
decide to connect their tracks and share a station or to locate in different 
stations and operate independently from each other. 
Formal cooperation agreements were required when two companies shared 
a station and had connected tracks, as they needed to coordinate on schedules 
in order to avoid accidents, on costs derived from the use of the station, and on 
fares, in particular when clients were requiring transportation from a station 
belonging to one of the network partners to a final destination served by the 
other partner and transited by the shared station. In this setting, although they 
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had different ticket offices, the companies used the same buildings, operated 
jointly all the services (such as restaurants or luggage delivery), and had 
agreements to charge passengers the same fares (Tedde de Lorca, 1978). 
These agreements were very similar to those observed in airline code-sharing 
agreements, in which two companies appear to compete by selling tickets for 
separate flights serving the same routes, but establish agreements to jointly 
operate on these routes and avoid competing with each other (Ito & Lee, 2007). 
When two companies operated from the same city but did not engage in 
formal cooperation, competition between them was more intense, not only when 
they served the same cities, but also when they offered different roads of 
potentially similar characteristics. Similarly to what has happened in the last 
decade with low-cost airlines (Shaw & Thomas, 2006), the availability of flights 
to once-remote locations increased the overall demand for flights. In the context 
of Spanish railways, firms that cooperated in a specific location by sharing a 
station also competed inside the station to sell tickets and provide freight 
services to the same customers and companies. Thus companies that served 
different destinations competed for the same clients based not on the ability to 
reach a specific final destination but based on prices and economic potential of 
the possible destinations (Artola, 1978). The fact that railways in situations of 
monopoly on specific destinations often lowered their fares to resist competition 
from other railroads serving different geographic points provides evidence 
regarding this competitive situation (Pascual Domènech, 1999). 
The decision to cooperate was not positively related to the distance over 
which companies were in contact: when two companies served the same cities, 
some decided to share stations, but in other cases, they built tracks that 
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operated parallel to each other over miles. The most extreme case occurred in 
the Valencia area (Eastern Spain) where two companies had parallel tracks for 
184 km (Vía-Libre, 1993). 
Some companies adopted a mixed strategy with their partners: in some 
places, they shared a station and cooperated actively, but in other cities they 
had separate stations and competed with each other. Since the cost of building 
and maintaining a station was likely to be higher than the cost of coordinating in 
another station once a first coordination agreement had been signed, these 
strategies must have brought some benefits in terms of increased income with 
respect to strategies dominated by cooperation. This is what I try to assess 
here. 
 
METHODS 
Data 
I used an original database including the 146 railway companies that 
operated in Spain at some point during the period 1848-1935. I gathered data 
on all the companies operating during this period from annual directories of the 
sector created by Enrique de la Torre (La Torre, 1893-1935), an engineer 
employed at the largest railway company. For years previous to 1893 I gathered 
information from the two weekly journals of the industry, the Gaceta de los 
Caminos de Hierro and the Revista de los Caminos de Hierro. All of the 
companies in the Spanish railway population transported passengers (although 
2 companies in my dataset operated for a few years with freight only before 
including passenger service) and most transported freight as well, with the 
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exception of some short-distance suburban companies that were dedicated to 
passenger transportation only. 
The number of railway companies operating in Spain varied between 1 in 
1848 and its maximum number of 94 in 1928 and the network length reached 
16.615 km at the end of my time frame. The evolution of the density of railway 
companies and the total railroad length over this period are represented in 
Figure 5 (p.54 in Chapter 3). 
 
Variables 
The objective of my model is to measure the effect of competition- and 
cooperation-dominated coopetitive strategies on profitability. I measure the 
dependent variable, profitability, as the yearly net income of railway companies, 
which I extract from La Torre directories and other secondary sources (Muñoz 
Rubio, 2006). 
My independent variables measure the coopetitive strategies adopted by 
the railway companies. As I mentioned in the previous section, coopetitive ties 
existed between railway companies that agreed on operating from the same 
station and coordinating on schedules, fares and use of tracks, while competing 
to capture customers in the area. When two organizations operated from the 
same city, they chose to cooperate in approximately 59% of the cases. In some 
of these instances, the railway companies had various contact points. Some 
chose to cooperate and share stations everywhere, but in many instances, they 
cooperated only in some cities and had different stations in other areas. I 
consider that companies use a cooperative-dominated strategy when they have 
cooperation agreements in all the cities that they jointly serve and that they use 
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a competitive-dominated strategy when they have cooperation agreements in 
some cities and have different stations in others. I extracted information on 
these strategies from the localization of each company’s roads and stations 
(Muñoz Rubio, 2006) and my variables are the count of these relationships for 
each railway company. 
In order to test the effect of these strategies at different density levels, I also 
used the interaction of the strategies variables with the density variable in my 
models. 
 
Controls 
I included a series of organizational and industrial control variables which 
also affect a firm’s profitability. I controlled for the profitability of the company in 
the previous year and for its age. The age of a company was measured as the 
time (in years) since the opening of a company’s first railroad and was taken 
from La Torre directories and Muñoz Rubio (2006). I took into account the date 
of opening because many of the railroads that were assigned through auctions 
never got built, or the companies that owned the rights for its exploitation sold it 
before the opening, either once the railroad was built or during its construction, 
so that I could not use the concession date as an indicator of operation in the 
railway industry. 
I also controlled for the attractiveness of a specific area, by indicating 
whether there were other railway companies operating in the area that did not 
have relationships with the focal firm. Among the environmental variables, I 
controlled for the effect of crowding and legitimation effects in the population, 
measured through population density in any given year (Carroll & Hannan, 
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1989). I also included an indicator of the economic activity in the country, the 
growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product. This series was taken from 
Carreras and Tafunell (2005). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 5 shows the means, standard deviations, minimum and maximum 
values, and correlations of the variables used in the model. 
 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4  6 7 8 
1. Net Income 2.85e+06 1.21e+07 -5.54e+06 1.24e+08 1.00        
2. Population 
density 
70.90 22.58 2.00 94.00 -0.02 
(0.21) 
1.00       
3. Cooperation-
dominated 
strategies 
1.75 2.89 0.00 28.00 0.88 
(0.00) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
1.00      
4. Competition-
dominated 
strategies 
0.46 1.33 0.00 11.00 0.89 
(0.00) 
0.07 
(0.00) 
0.81 
(0.00) 
1.00     
5. Concentration 64.40 5.26 57.36 100.00 0.01 
(0.67) 
-0.68 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
(0.00) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
1.00    
6. Attractiveness 
of the area 
1.22 2.24 0.00 15.00 0.80 
(0.00) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.67 
(0.00) 
0.78 
(0.00) 
-0.02 
(0.38) 
1.00   
7. Age 22.10 15.86 1.00 82.00 0.34 
(0.00) 
0.41 
(0.00) 
0.38 
(0.00) 
0.35 
(0.00) 
-0.14 
(0.00) 
0.32 
(0.00) 
1.00  
8. Growth rate 0.02 0.04 -0.12 0.12 0.00 
(0.88) 
0.09 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.87) 
-0.00 
(0.85) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.97) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
1.00 
 
The analysis is performed on a panel of 134 firms (of the 144 companies 
that operated form more than two years in the Spanish railway industry at some 
point between 1848 and 1935) for which I have an average of 24.8 years of 
data. 
I estimate the relationship between cooperation- and competition 
dominated coopetitive strategies and net income in the Spanish railway 
population through a Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) model (Hardin & 
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Hilbe, 2002; Zeger, Liang, & Albert, 1988) with an autoregressive correlation 
structure of order 1. The results of the estimations are shown in Table 6. 
Model 1 only includes the control variables, Model 2 includes the 
independent variables that capture coopetitive strategies, and Model 3 adds the 
interaction of the strategies with the density levels in order to test my 
hypotheses. 
 
Table 6: GEE Estimates of the net income of Spanish railway companies 
Variables 
 
Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 
 
Net income t-1 0.98*** 
(0.00) 
0.93*** 
(0.01) 
0.93*** 
(0.01) 
Population density -5,654.99*** 
(1,736.78) 
-8,404.12*** 
(1,786.12) 
-7,166.80*** 
(1,984.08) 
Cooperation-dominated strategies  156,985.76*** 
(20,384.18) 
202,561.77*** 
(61,469.63) 
Cooperation-dominated strategies * Density   -462.32 
(810.46) 
Competition-dominated strategies  178,246.52*** 
(47,374.27) 
449,979.35*** 
(129,517.70) 
Competition-dominated strategies *Density   -3,422.89** 
(1,692.09) 
Concentration -10,220.57 
(7,162.18) 
-11,333.83 
(7,230.34) 
-13,405.17* 
(7,310.40) 
Attractiveness of the area 118,541.10*** 
(19,625.24) 
124,186.63*** 
(20,681.26) 
125,545.30*** 
(21,010.89) 
Growth rate  1,223,022.94* 
(736,746.41) 
1,238,918.14* 
(725,609.32) 
1,277,031.05* 
(724,961.82) 
Age -454.52 
(1,993.95) 
-1,699.54 
(2,023.43) 
-1,831.79 
(2,019.04) 
Constant 1,006,926.72* 
(552,219.39) 
1,083,584.69* 
(558,400.17) 
1,107,857.40* 
(568,902.20) 
Number of observations 
 
3322 3322 3322 
Number of firms 
 
134 134 134 
Wald Chi2 
 
208,350.76*** 203,433.75*** 204,580.79*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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The fit of the models is best for Model 3, which includes all the strategies 
and their interactions with the density measure. I find that profitability is 
positively and strongly related with previous performance. The results also 
indicate that the density level reduces the net income of the railway companies 
(coefficient equal to -7,166.80 in Table 6, significant at the 1% level), but that 
local density of other railway companies (“attractiveness of the area” in Table 6) 
is positively related to the income, showing that it is more profitable to locate in 
the area of the market that is denser in customers and resources even though 
there is intense localized competition in that area. Age does not have a 
significant effect on performance, and economic growth is only weakly related to 
superior profits (the coefficient is positive, but only significant at the 10% level). 
I find support for hypothesis 1: competition-dominated coopetitive strategies 
increase the companies’ net income (coefficient: 449,979.35, significant at the 
1% level), but the effect decreases and eventually becomes negative as density 
gets higher (interaction term: -3,422.89, significant at the 5% level). I only find 
partial support for hypothesis 2: cooperation-dominated coopetitive strategies 
increase a company’s income (the coefficient is equal to 202,561.77 and 
significant at the 1% level), but the effect does not vary with density. However, 
given that competition-dominated coopetition and having no coopetitive 
relationships both become detrimental strategies at high density levels and that 
the hypothesis that the effect of cooperation-dominated relationships on 
performance was equal to the effect of competition-dominated relationships was 
rejected in Models 2 and 3, I find that the companies in my sample would be 
better off by choosing competition-dominated coopetition when the density is 
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low and cooperation-dominated coopetition when the density is high. This 
situation is illustrated by Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Marginal effect of an additional cooperation- or competition-
dominated strategy under different density levels 
 
 
I also find that the difference in the performance generated by these 
strategies is significantly different from zero, and that the main effect of the 
competition-dominated strategies on performance is superior to the effect of 
cooperation-dominated strategies. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
In the Spanish railway industry I can easily track the coopetitive contacts 
between all operating firms. Thus, I am able to measure the impact of different 
coopetitive strategies on financial performance for small and large firms over a 
long period of time. 
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y
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Firms maintain coopetitive relationships characterized by intense 
competition, and not full commitment, between partners because these 
relationships lead to superior performance. This finding goes in line with the 
idea that both cohesion and structural holes are beneficial in networks (Gargiulo 
& Benassi, 2000). It could be the result of higher bargaining power in 
competition-dominated relationships, or of over-embeddedness in cooperation-
dominated relationships, particularly in this specific setting in which the fixed 
costs of building a track make the ending of a partnership very costly and 
difficult. 
However, as the market becomes crowded, coopetitive relationships that 
are characterized by intense cooperation and reduced competition become 
more profitable. This is consistent with the fact that higher density levels mean 
that the overall competition in the industry is intense (Carroll & Hannan, 1989), 
and a good means to mitigate the negative effects of competition that erodes 
profit margins is to engage in cooperative relationships characterized by 
commitment and trust. 
This study presents a number of limitations: I make a distinction between 
two possibilities for coopetitive strategies, cooperation- and competition-
dominated strategies, while it is very likely that there is a wide range of 
possibilities in between. Thus, companies that share ten stations and compete 
in one city by not sharing a station would be treated here as engaging in a 
competition-dominated strategy. Fortunately, this situation never happens in the 
population, and when two companies cooperate and compete in different cities, 
the number of stations in which they perform one or the other strategy is roughly 
equivalent. Secondly, I do not have detailed accounts of the competitive moves 
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made by each company in the cities in which it has competitors, and thus I am 
unable to track the evolution of competition over time and under different 
competitive structures. This would be an interesting issue to examine in a future 
study. 
Overall, the contribution of this paper is to show which strategies are 
beneficial under different industry structures. The main results are that 
competition-dominated and cooperation-dominated strategies are both an 
important means to increase financial performance5, that competition-
dominated strategies are usually more profitable than cooperation-dominated 
strategies but that they lead to increasingly lower profits as the market becomes 
crowded. We also find that this effect is due to crowding on the market, and not 
to concentration and the fact that some firms dominate the market and extract 
most rents. Another important contribution of this paper is that it uses a 
database that includes all the relationships between companies in a single 
industry, thus allowing me to perform a quantitative analysis and to include 
small, less successful firms, instead of focusing on a few salient cases, in 
general for large, very profitable organizations, which is what most previous 
qualitative and quantitative studies on coopetition within an industry have been 
doing and has limited the practical implications that can be drawn from the 
coopetition literature. 
 
 
  
                                                          
5
 This could explain the result in Chapter 3 that firms sometimes engage in cooperative 
relationships that harm their long-term survival chances: they choose this strategy because it 
increases their short-term financial performance. 
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Chapter 5 - Conclusions 
This dissertation has analyzed the impact of interorganizational 
relationships on short-term and long-term organizational performance. All the 
papers are based on quantitative analyses of a database that was constructed 
for this thesis, and which includes economic information on all the railway 
companies that operated in Spain since the beginning of the industry in 1848 
until the Spanish Civil War. 
The first paper in this dissertation examines the impact of direct 
relationships, between firms that directly interact with each other, and of diffuse 
relationships, between firms that operate in the same industry but that do not 
have direct relationships, on organizational relationships. This chapter 
contributes to the literature in population ecology and shows that localized 
competition and cooperation between firms respectively increases and reduces 
mortality rates, but that the impact of diffuse relationships persists after 
controlling for all direct relationships. 
The second paper examines in a more detailed fashion direct relationships 
between firms and assesses the impact of these relationships on mortality, 
depending on the organizational form of the companies that cooperate with 
each other. It contributes to the literatures in social networks and population 
ecology by showing that connections between firms have different benefits 
depending on the identity and resources of each connected organization. In 
particular, it shows that some cooperation strategies can generate a liability of 
connectedness by hindering the long-term survival chances of the organizations 
that engage in such strategies, and that the effects of connections can be 
asymmetrical for the connected partners. 
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Finally, the third paper examines the effect of different coopetitive strategies 
on the financial performance of Spanish railway companies. It shows that 
strategies that are dominated by competition lead to higher financial 
performance than strategies that are dominated by cooperation, but this effect 
decreases as the number of competitors in the industry increases. This paper 
contributes to the strategy literature in general by showing which strategies are 
beneficial under different industry structures, and to the literature on coopetition 
in particular by using a database that includes all the relationships between 
companies in an industry over a long period of time, instead of focusing on a 
few salient cases as most previous studies on coopetition have done. 
This dissertation presents a number of general limitations. First of all, most 
firms carried both passengers and freight, but presented very important 
differences in the relative intensity of the two activities. However, the 
information on the number of passengers transported each year was much 
more complete than the information on freight activity, and was consistently 
reported in the same unit, whereas figures on freight were reported by different 
companies as weight of the goods transported or as total amount charged, 
which did not enable comparisons. Since the number of passengers was 
strongly correlated to the tons of freight transported when the information was 
available, and very strongly correlated to income in all cases, I believe that this 
is not a major problem in this setting.  
A second issue is that the ties that I discuss throughout the three essays 
are not randomly assigned, but result from the decisions of firms, which are 
themselves constrained by the initial decision to locate in a specific geographic 
area. A third related limitation is that I did not explain in this dissertation the 
 104 
mechanisms behind the formation of ties between railway companies. However, 
it seems that the decision to engage in cooperative ties is not driven by 
differences in performance with respect to similar firms, and the pattern of 
results is consistent with what could be expected if the ties were randomly 
assigned. 
Another limitation of this dissertation is that I have only focused on the 
effect of direct, dyadic ties between partners, and not on the benefits that 
indirect ties could provide. Adopting a network perspective on the issues 
discussed in the three essays would be an important development. 
Finally, the result that managers in railway companies engaged in ties that 
harmed the survival chances of their firms seems inconsistent with the idea that 
managers are fully or boundedly rational. However, the third essay shows that it 
is not necessary to assume any kind of irrationality of the railroad managers to 
explain these relationships: the same cooperative ties that could create a 
liability of connectedness often led to superior financial performance. 
This dissertation opens different avenues for future research. The first 
essay highlights the importance of disentangling direct and diffuse processes, 
but does not show how these processes interact with each other. However, the 
second and third essays show how the strategic decision of locating in a 
specific area and engaging in ties with other competitors in a sector is affected 
by population-level forces that are beyond the direct control of managers. Thus, 
I intend to examine the interaction of the different processes. Furthermore, in 
order to disentangle direct and diffuse processes, it would also be useful to 
distinguish between diffuse competition and diffuse legitimation, which are 
 105 
usually both measured by density. I intend to gather data on more specific 
dimensions of legitimacy in the sector in order to do so. 
The second essay offers interesting results on the effect of ties between 
asymmetric partners, an area that has received very little attention in previous 
research. While in this essay, I have only looked at asymmetries that result from 
the organizational forms of the partners, other types of asymmetries are likely to 
lead to similar patterns. Here, I have only examined the effects of dyadic ties, 
but asymmetries in the network to which different partners get access through 
connections are also likely to impact performance. 
The third essay shows the benefits of analyzing in greater depth the 
possible variations in intensity of competition and cooperation between alliance 
partners. While I have done a first step in this direction, there is a large range of 
possibilities that has not been addressed in the paper, and which need further 
analysis. 
As I have mentioned earlier, in the three essays, the ties that affect short- 
and long-term performance are not randomly assigned, and the explanation of 
the mechanisms leading to their formation also needs to be examined in future 
research. 
Finally, the diffusion of management practices between companies that 
were connected to each other is another important consequence of 
interorganizational relationships. In the railway industry, diffusion seems to have 
occurred first between French companies and their Spanish subsidiaries, and 
then to have shaped the practices in the Spanish industry through ties, because 
the cooperation agreements between companies lead to intentional and 
unintentional convergence of different management aspects. The examination 
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of company reports in search for possible network externalities in the diffusion 
of practices is another interesting area for future research. 
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